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I. INTRODUCTION
"Alas my love you do me wrong
To cast me off discourteously."'
In Pickering v. Board of Education,2 the Supreme Court again reject-
ed the theory that public employment, which may be denied altogether,
can be subject to any conditions, regardless of the reasonableness of
such conditions.3 This does not imply that public management cannot
demand some semblance of loyalty from its employees by requiring them
not to "air their dirty laundry" and disparage management in public, not-
withstanding the First Amendment.4 As stated by the Pickering Court:
[Ilt cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating
the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem
in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees.5
1. Greens/eeves (lyrics by King Henry VIII).
2. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
3. See id. at 568 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06
(1967)). One federal court, commenting on the First Amendment rights of employees,
stated that "[t]he interest in holding a job with a governmental agency is not itself a
First Amendment interest." See Rose v. Eastern Neb. Human Servs. Agency, 510 F.
Supp 1343, 1355 (D. Neb. 1981) (discussed in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
575 n.14 (1971)).
Instead, the protections of the First Amendment come into play when a gov-
ernment employer makes the decision to deprive a public employee of the
benefit of government employment on a basis that infringes his interest in
freedom of speech or association, since 'if the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or asso-
ciations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized or in-
hibited.'
Id. (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1971)).
4. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The First Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
5. Picketing, 391 U.S. at 568.
Of special note in Pickering is that the employer argued that a teacher
who wrote a negative letter to the editor, by virtue of his public employ-
ment, "'has a duty of loyalty to support his superiors ... and that, if he
must speak out publicly, he should do so factually and accurately.... .,,"
The Court stated that absent proof that false statements were made
knowingly or recklessly, "a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on
issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal
from public employment."7 The Court declared that it was neither appro-
priate nor feasible to apply a general standard by which employees' state-
ments may be judged.8 However, the Court did point out that the em-
ployment relationships at issue did not involve "the kind of close work-
ing relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning."9 In a
footnote, the Court stated further:
It is possible to conceive of some positions in public employment in which the
need for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public statements
might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal. Likewise, positions in public
employment in which the relationship between superior and subordinate is of
such a personal and intimate nature that certain forms of public criticism of the
superior by the subordinate would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the
working relationship between them can also be imagined.'0
In a 1983 decision, Connick v. Myers," the Supreme Court considered
the discharge of a state employee for circulating a questionnaire concern-
ing internal office matters. 2 The plaintiff, Sheila Myers, an assistant dis-
trict attorney, circulated a questionnaire "soliciting the views of her fel-
low staff members concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the
need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors,
and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns." 3
After distributing the questionnaire to fifteen assistant district attorneys,
Myers was terminated. 4 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court, reversing
the district 5 and appellate courts," pointed out that "[tihe repeated
emphasis in Pickering on the right of a public employee 'as a citizen, in
6. See id. at 568-69 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280
(1964)).
7. See id. at 574.
8. See id. at 569.
9. See id. at 570.
10. Id. at 570 n.3.
11. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
12. See id. at 140.
13. See id. at 141.
14. See id.
15. See Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. La. 1981), affd, 654 F.2d 719
(5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
16. See Myers v. Connick, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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commenting upon matters of public concern,' was not accidental."1 7 Jus-
tice Byron White, writing for the majority, noted that, unlike the issues
that Myers addressed, the subject matter in Pickering was "'a matter of
legitimate public concern' upon which 'free and open debate is vital to
informed decision-making by the electorate.""' 8 Justice White wrote:
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters
of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal in-
terest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropri-
ate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a pub-
lic agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior."
Justice White stated further that "[o]ur responsibility is to ensure that
citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for
the government; this does not require a grant of immunity for employee
grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not
work for the State.""
According to the majority, only "[o]ne question in Myers' question-
naire... touch[edj upon a matter of public concern."2' The Court con-
cluded that the survey "was most accurately characterized as an employ-
ee grievance concerning internal office policy."22 Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the dissent,' argued that the manner in which a government
agency operates is a matter of public concern and that Pickering had
17. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.
18. See id. at 145 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72
(1968)).
19. Id. at 147 (citation omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 149.
22. Id. at 154. One commentator argued that "[i]t is difficult to understand how
the Court could conclude that Myers' questionnaire about working. conditions fell out-
side its definition of public concern, given other opinions in which it has stated in
eloquent terms that similar concerns are 'public concerns.'" Toni M. Massaro, Signif-
icant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 29 (1987); see also Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir.
1985) (stating that letters to superiors concerning co-workers at hospital involved
"personal grievances," not matters of public concern); Yoggerst v. Hedges, 739 F.2d
293, 296 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that state employee's comment, "Did you hear the
good news?," upon hearing that supervisor had been dismissed, was not protected
under First Amendment because it related to personal feelings); Boehm v. Foster, 670
F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that letter sent by employee to supervisor,
which was parody of notice normally sent by management to employees, was not
protected by First Amendment).
23. In Connick, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. See
Connick, 461 U.S. at 156-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
established that discussion about how government agencies function is
vital to informed decision making by the public.24 According to the dis-
sent, the majority incorrectly ignored the complexity of determining
when speech is a matter of public concern and, in the process, underval-
ued the interest of the public in evaluating the conduct of public offi-
cials.
2
When does an employee's speech touch a matter of legitimate public
concern? Are some topics, such as speaking out on racial discrimination,
inherently of public concern even if made in a private forum?26 What
about sex discrimination? 27 Suppose an employee announced that, in
her view, gays were unfairly discriminated against by the federal, state,
and local governments and then stated, by the way, "as a gay person, I,
too, have been the object of discrimination." Is the speech protected?
What if the speech relates to nuclear safety? May an employee working
for a nuclear generating station write letters to a newspaper castigating
her employer's record on safety?21 What if an employee helped build the
24. See id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 163-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 148 n.8 (stating that racial discrimination is "a matter inherently of
public concern").
27. See, e.g., Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 980 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that sexual harassment of employees by public official is inherently of public
concern); Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a corrections
officer's complaint was not protected even though relating to harassment of a co-
worker because the "main thrust of her speech took the form of a private employee
grievance"); Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263, 1269 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that police officer's reporting of sexual harassment was protected by the First
Amendment because reports of harassment are "of great public concern," and such
reports were made "both as a citizen and an employee"); Callaway v. Hafeman, 832
F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating in dictum that "incidences of sexual harassment
in a public school district are inherently matters of public concern").
What about bisexuality? In Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, the
Supreme' Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari as to the Sixth Circuit's hold-
ing that it was permissible for a school district to refuse renewal of a high school
guidance counselor's contract because she was bisexual and revealed her sexual pref-
erence to her secretary and fellow teachers in private conversations. See Rowland v.
Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984).
Although a jury found the employee's mention of her bisexuality did not in any way
"interfere[] with the proper performance of [her or other school staff members'] du-
ties or with the operation of the school generally," the Sixth Circuit, nevertheless,
reasoned that the refusal to renew based on her wQrkplace statements was unobjec-
tionable under the First Amendment because, under Connick, her speech was not "a
matter of public concern." See Rowland, 730 F.2d at 447-49.
28. See, e.g.,. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
Local 465, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1039, 1041 (1983) (Johnston, Arb.) (upholding written
reprimand to engineer for writing article to local newspaper on safety record of sta-
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facility and was writing an article to complain about faulty welds? What
about a teacher who complains to the school board about the disciplin-
ary policies of her school or her low salary? Is the speech any less pro-
tected if she complained to her principal or chairman as opposed to
"outsiders?"29 What if the case is a "mixed motive" case where an indi-
vidual complaint is a personal grievance (her complaint of sex discrimi-
nation) that also is a matter of concern to the population at large? In
such a case, does the employee lose her constitutional protection when
she goes public? Are there special rules for those in the protective servic-
es where discipline and cohesion are paramount administrative consid-
erations? How should management proceed when there is a dispute as to
what the employee said? Do arbitrators' decisions in the area of em-
ployee loyalty and speech track court decisions? Does it matter whether
the arbitration involves public, as opposed to private sector employees?
What about speech through e-mail? Is disparaging speech at the
workplace inherently more disruptive than speech during off-duty hours
or speech away from the workplace?
This Article will analyze court and arbitrators' decision dealing with
employees' free speech rights in relation to the employees' overall "duty
of loyalty" ° to their employers. Guidelines are suggested for labor and
tion).
29. See, e.g., Wales v. Board of Educ., 120 F.3d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding
school district's refusal to renew teacher's contract after teacher wrote memorandum
to principal advocating tougher discipline standards for students); see also infra note
31 and accompanying text (discussing the public-concern test).
30. The so-called "duty of loyalty" has been discussed by numerous arbitrators, in-
cluding Past President of the National Academy of Arbitrators, Edgar Jones. See, e.g.,
Los Angeles Herald-Examiner v. Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
453 (1967) (Jones, Arb.). According to Arbitrator Jones, the normal duties of any em-
ployee include "his obligation to do his best to act or refrain from acting so as to
enhance rather than endanger the best interests of his employer. This is the duty of
loyalty." Id. at 464. Jones argued:
The most obvious and common instance, shared by members of practically
all nations, tribes or clans in human history, is loyalty to one's native land.
Next perhaps, in terms of the number of persons affected, is probably the
employer-employee relationship. Certainly this is so in the United States.
As part of the complex of rights and duties comprising the employment
relationship, the duty of loyalty of an employee to an employer must certain-
ly be reckoned as an important aspect of the common enterprise .... As
marked out in decisions in cases in which an employee has been disciplined
or terminated for allegedly violating it, it is a practical command subject to a
rule of reason.
Id.; see also Chesapeake Paper Prods. Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local
management practitioners who consider disciplining employees for
breaches of loyalty, specifically speech regarding management of the
company, its service, or its products. It is our thesis that, with selected
exceptions, it is difficult to predict speech that addresses matters of
"public concern" and speech that does not, especially within a collective
bargaining or union context. More importantly, given that a threshold
public-concern test is satisfied, as suggested by Judge Frank Easterbrook
of the Seventh Circuit, such "[o]pen-ended [Pickering] balancing...
create[s] unavoidable risks and costs for well-intentioned public employ-
ers, risks that the doctrine of qualified immunity reduces but not to ze-
ro."3' Employees have a similar risk, although not involving judicial im-
munity. Their risk is dismissal from employment when a court or arbi-
trator will not immunize their speech. Under the current status of consti-
tutional and arbitral case law, the end result for employees desiring to
maximize their chances of remaining on the job is this: "Keep your criti-
cism to yourself." More often than not, application of a Picketing balanc-
ing process in disloyalty cases will result in a decision for management.
Despite the flaws associated with the Picketing test, we see no better
647, 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 498, 501 (1994) (Nolan, Arb.) (upholding dismissal of em-
ployee who failed to report co-worker's theft and lied about his knowledge of inci-
dent, reasoning that "if the Grievant knew [his co-worker] was planning a theft and
failed to stop him, he would, as the Company argues, have violated his duty of loyal-
ty to the employer. One who knowingly tolerates theft from one's employer is no
better than the thief"); Sauget Sanitary Dev. & Research Ass'n v. International Union
of Operating Eng'rs Local 2, 98 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1082, 1085 (1992) (Cipolla, Arb.)
(discussing loyalty within context of employees' duty to cooperate in an investigation
and stating that "[tihere is a great deal of arbitral authority which indicates that
discipline is appropriate in situations where employees refuse to cooperate with a
Company's investigation of an incident which interfers [sic] with the Company's on-
going business").
The primary focus of this Article concerns the employee's duty of loyalty as it
relates to speech. "Loyalty" with respect to (1) conflicts of interest, such as "moon-
lighting," (2) turning in a co-worker for on-duty misconduct, (3) cooperating in an in-
vestigation, and (4) rudeness or inappropriate speech to customers is not considered
in this article. See generally Steven J. Goldsmith & Louis Shuman, Common Causes
of Discipline, in 1 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 16, § 16.05 (Tim Bornstein
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997) (discussing "disloyalty" by employees); MARVIN HILL & A.V.
SINICROPI, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS: A LEGAL AND ARBITRAL ANALYSIS 235 (1989) (discuss-
ing arbitrators decisions dealing with employee disloyalty); Marvin F. Hill, Jr. &
James A. Wright, Employee Refusals to Cooperate in Internal Investigations: "Into
the Woods" with Employers, Courts, and Labor Arbitrators, 56 MO. L. REV. 869
(1991) (discussing employees who choose not to cooperate with an employer's legiti-
mate investigation of employment-related issues); Ron Lepinskas, Comment, The NLRA
and the Duty of Loyalty: Protecting Public Disparagement, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 643
(1993) (discussing the NLRA's application to cases where employees defame their
employers).
31. See Wales, 120 F.3d at 85.
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alternative to a case-by-case balancing approach in employee speech
cases. Whether the status of the law makes for good policy and econom-
ics is an open question.
H. BACKGROUND: PICKERING AND ITS PROGENY
In 1892, unencumbered by twentieth century judicial activism, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that a policeman "may have a constitution-
al right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man."32 However, this simplistic nineteenth century view of the rights of
public employees did not remain static. In the latter half of the twentieth
century, judicial review of the rights and protection afforded by the Con-
stitution has evolved into what modern legal scholars term the "uncon-
stitutional conditions" doctrine.' Clear and simple, the government
"'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his consti-
tutionally protected.., freedom of speech' even if he has no entitlement
to that benefit."'
32. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892)
(holding public employer's rule limiting policeman's speech valid and that violation of
such rule can be grounds for lawful termination). In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983), the Supreme Court noted: "For many years, Holmes' epigram expressed this
Court's law." Id. at 144.
33. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-49 & n.24 (1968).
34. Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (1996) (quoting
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). As noted in Connick, starting in the
1950s, the Supreme Court started "cast[ing] new light on the matter . . . ." See
Connick, 461 U.S. at 144. In Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), the Court
held that a state could not require its employees to establish their loyalty by extract-
ing an oath denying past affiliation with the Communists. See id. at 191-92; see also
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (recognizing that state could not deny
an appointment to a public office because of refusal to declare a belief in existence
of God); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961)
(recognizing that the government could not deny employment because of previous
membership in particular party); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278,
287-88 (1961) (recognizing that state could not deny employment because of refusal
to take an oath denying involvement with the Communist party); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960) (recognizing that state could not deny employment be-
cause of teacher's membership in or contribution to particular organizations). In its
1963 decision, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court noted it was already
"too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." Id. at
404. Finally, the infrastructure was completed in 1967 in Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), when the Court invalidated a New York statute barring
Justice Holmes may have correctly reasoned that a police officer has
"no constitutional right to be a policeman."" However, still bound by
the First Amendment, at least according to modem constitutional doc-
trine, the government may not jeopardize or infringe upon an individual's
liberty to be a police officer or hold other public employment as a result
of the individual's exercise of his or her freedom of speech.'
The predominant growth of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
with respect to public employees' freedom of speech came with the Su-
preme Court's 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of Education."
Pickering worked its way through the judiciary after a high school dis-
missed a teacher, Marvin Pickering, for sending a letter to a local news-
paper opposing a proposed tax increase for public schools and criticizing
the Board of Education and the Superintendent for their past handling of
public funds.' As required by state law at the time, the School Board
held a full hearing regarding Pickering's actions and determined that the
publication of the letter was "'detrimental to the efficient operation and
administration of the schools of the district."'39 Mr. Pickering's dismissal
was thereby upheld.'0 He appealed the decision through the Illinois
courts.4
In characteristically "Holmesian" logic, the Supreme Court of Illinois
found that the issue for resolution was "not whether the board may be
publicly subjected to false accusations, but whether it must continue to
employ one who publishes misleading statements which are reasonably
believed to be detrimental to the schools."42 In the Court's view, Marvin
Pickering was not a "mere member of the public."' As a teacher, and
under Illinois law, he was "no more entitled to harm the schools by
speech then by incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality, or any
other conduct for which there may be no legal sanction."' According to
the court, when Pickering elected to teach, he "undertook the obligation
to refrain from conduct which in the absence of such position he would
employment on the basis of membership in subversive organizations, observing that
"'the theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subject-
ed to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.'"
See id. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir.
1965)).
35. See McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517.
36. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
37. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
38. See id. at 564-65.
39. See id. at 564 (source of internal quote omitted in original).
40. See id. at 564-65.
41. See id. at 565.
42. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. 1967).
43. See id.
44. See id.
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have an undoubted right to engage in."" The tenure provisions were
"not intended to preclude dismissal where the conduct is detrimental to
the efficient operation of administration of the schools of the district.""
Prior to Marvin Pickering's appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
earlier Supreme Court decisions laid a foundation for overturning the
ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court.47 In a number of decisions, starting
in the early 1960s, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the right of
speech should be strictly protected from governmental intrusion.' As
early as 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner,49 the Court specifically noted that
"[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and ex-
pression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon
a benefit or privilege."' One year later, in Garrison v. Louisiana,5 the
Court opined that "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government."52 Similarly, in other
cases decided before Pickering's appeal, the Court addressed the proce-
dural protection of the Due Process Clause concerning public speech and
freedom of affiliation rights.'
Perhaps the most persuasive pre-Pickering authority, however, was the
Court's decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.' In Keyishian, the
Supreme Court clearly articulated the foundations of the modern uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine.5 There, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
declared: "'[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unrea-
sonable, has been uniformly rejected."'' Thus, by 1968, the Court was
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See ifmra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
48. See id.
49. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
50. Id. at 404.
51. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
52. Id. at 74-75.
53. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-
99 (1961) (discussing due process violations for governmental denials of employment
based upon political affiliation); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960) (dis-
cussing due process violations found in state requirements for teacher loyalty oaths);
Wieman v. Updergraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952) (finding due process violations in
loyalty oaths requiring denials of past Communist affiliations).
54. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
55. See id. at 607-10.
56. Id. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d
Cir. 1965)).
ready to apply the Keyishian unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
Marvin Pickering's First Amendment challenge.57 Justice Marshall direct-
ly challenged the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court by stating that
if the Illinois Supreme Court was suggesting "that teachers may constitu-
tionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they
would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public inter-
est in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they
work,... numerous prior [Supreme Court] decisions" have already ruled
on this question and rejected it.'
However, in Pickering, the Supreme Court was not prepared to com-
pletely ignore the Board of Education's interest in the duty of loyalty
expected from its employees.59 The Court specifically recognized that
the state, as an employer, has interests in regulating the speech of its
workforce "that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."' The Court
acknowledged two competing and parallel interests in the speech of
public employees.6 According to the Court, under cases such as
Keyishian, public employees have a recognized First Amendment right
to comment on matters of public interest and, to some extent, should not
be compelled to waive that right in order to hold public employment. 2
On the other hand, public entities acting as employers have an acknowl-
edged interest in promoting the efficiency of the public service they per-
form through their employees.' The Court's solution was a judicial bal-
ancing act involving the individual's freedom of speech interests and
those interests of public employers in managing the efficient and effec-
tive provision of public services.' The Court cautioned that "[b]ecause
of the enormous variety of fact situations" in which speech "by teachers
and other public employees may be thought by [management] to furnish
grounds for dismissal" it was neither appropriate nor feasible "to attempt
to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be
judged."65
In applying the Pickering balance to Marvin Pickering's statements, the
Court found that his speech was not directed toward any person with
57. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1968).
58. See id. at 568 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589; Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; Wieman,
344 U.S. 183).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 568.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 568-73.
65. See id. at 569.
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whom Pickering worked directly.' Further, no question regarding the
maintenance of "either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony
among coworkers" was at issue.67 Moreover, because Pickering directed
his statements toward the decisions of the Board of Education, and be-
cause Pickering did not have a direct working relationship with the
Board, the Court discounted the Board's interest in personal employee
loyalty and confidence.' The Court also found that the Board of Educa-
tion did not present evidence that Mr. Pickering's statements had an
actual or per se harmful or detrimental impact upon the Board, teachers,
administrators, or residents of the district.' In fact, according to the
Court, some of Pickering's statements amounted to mere assertions of
opinion regarding the Board's operating procedures, as opposed to state-
ments of fact.7' In addition to these factors weighing in the balance, the
Court found that "the question whether a school requires additional
funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of
the school administration, including the School Board, cannot, in a soci-
ety that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as conclusive.""
In the Court's opinion, this was a situation where "free and open debate
is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate."72 "[T]he mem-
bers of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions
as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be
spent" are the insiders, the teachers.7' "Accordingly, it is essential that
[teachers] be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of
retaliatory dismissal."74 The Court concluded that "absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of
his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the
basis for his dismissal from public employment."76
In Perry v. Sindermann,6 the Court was again faced with a teacher's
claim that his contract was not renewed in retaliation against his public
disagreements with the policies of his employers, the Board of Regents
66. See id. at 569-70.
67. See id. at 570.
68. See id. at 569-70.
69. See id. at 570-73.
70. See id. at 571.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 572.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).
76. 408 U.S. 593 (1971).
of a junior college in Texas.77 The Court reiterated its previous deci-
sions, stating that the government "may not deny a benefit to a person
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-espe-
cially... freedom of speech."78 If this were the case, public manage-
ment could "'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.'"'79
On the same day the Court handed down the Perry decision, the Court
decided the Board of Regents v. Roth.' However, in Roth, the Court
pointed out that "the interest in holding a teaching job at a state universi-
ty, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest."" Even though the
Perry Court recognized that the government may not deny public em-
ployment to any individual on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests in freedom of speech,' the same Court in .Roth was
unwilling to compare that prohibition to a direct impingement upon in-
terests in free speech.' The Perry Court, relying on Roth, specifically
rejected the court of appeal's suggestion that Sindermann "might have a
due process right to some kind of hearing simply if he asserts to college
77. See id. at 592-94. Mr. Sindermann "was a teacher in the state college system
of the State of Texas." Id. at 594. In 1965, "he became a professor of Government
and Social Science at Odessa Junior College." Id. "He was employed at the college
[Odessa] for four successive years, under a series of one-year contracts." Id. For a
time, he was appointed co-chairman of his department. Id. In the 1968-1969 school
year, he "was elected president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association."
See id. In that capacity, he was required to leave "his teaching duties on several
occasions to testify before committees of the Texas Legislature." Id. "[H]e became in-
volved in public disagreements with the policies of the college's Board of Regents."
Id. at 595. Finally, in 1969, Mr. Sindermann's "one-year employment contract terminat-
ed and the Board of Regents voted not to offer him a new contract for the next aca-
demic year." Id.
78. See id. at 597.
79. See id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
80. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
81. Id. at 575 n.14.
82. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
83. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 575 n.14. In Roth, the Court stated:
When a State would directly impinge upon interests in free speech or free
press, this Court has on occasion held that opportunity for a fair adversary
hearing must precede the action, whether or not the speech or press interest
is clearly protected under substantive First Amendment standards. Thus, we
have required fair notice and opportunity for an adversary hearing before an
injunction is issued against the holding of rallies and public meetings. Sim-
ilarly, we have indicated the necessity of procedural safeguards before a
State makes a large scale seizure of a person's allegedly obscene books,
magazines, and so forth.
In the respondent's case, however, the State had not directly impinged
upon interests in free speech or free press in any way comparable to a sei-
zure of books or an injunction against meetings.
Id. (citation omitted).
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officials that their decision was based on his constitutionally protected
conduct."'
Likewise, in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,' the Court was faced with an untenured teacher whose contract
was not renewed' due in part to the teacher's clearly protected free
speech. 7 The Court disagreed with the district court's finding that, sim-
ply because the protected conduct played a substantial part of the deci-
sion not to rehire, a violation of the teacher's freedom of speech oc-
curred.' Such a rule "could place an employee in a better position as a
result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he
would have occupied had he done nothing." 9 According to the Court,
an employer should be allowed to present as a defense the argument
that, apart from the constitutionally protected conduct that it considered,
the employee's record "was such that he would not have been rehired in
any event."" The goal, said the Court, was to construct a test that "pro-
tects against the invasion of constitutional rights without commanding
undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those
rights."9 The Court concluded that the burden would be on the employ-
84. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 599 n.5 (citation omitted).
85. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
86. See id. at 276. "Doyle was first employed by the Board in 1966[,] work[ing]
under one-year contracts for the first three years, and under a two-year contract" for
the next two years. See id. at 281. In 1969, "he was elected president of the
Teacher's Association." Id. Unrelated to his role as president of the teacher's associa-
tion, Doyle became involved in a number of work-related incidents involving disci-
pline. See id. First, "he engaged in an argument with another teacher" in which he
was slapped and subsequently refused to accept an apology. See id. at 281-82. On
another occasion, he argued with employees of a school cafeteria, called some stu-
dents "sons of bitches," and made an obscene gesture to girls. See id. Finally, Doyle
leaked a "memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance" to the local media.
See id. at 282. Shortly thereafter, while making his usual recommendations to the
School Board regarding rehiring of nontenured teachers, the Superintendent
.recommended Doyle not be rehired." See id.
87. See id. at 284-85. After a bench trial, "the [d]istrict [clourt found that all of
[the] incidents had in fact occurred. It concluded that . . .Doyle's [leak to the me-
dia] was 'clearly protected by the First Amendment,' and that because it had played
a 'substantial part' in the decision of the Board not to renew Doyle's employment, he
was entitled to reinstatement with backpay." Id. at 283 (quoting App. to Petition for
Cert. 12a-13a).
88. See id. at 285.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 286.
91. See id.
ee "to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this
conduct was a 'substantial factor' or. . . 'motivating factor' in the
Board's decision not to rehire him."92 Because Doyle carried that bur-
den, it would be up to management to show "by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to
respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected con-
duct."'3 It would then be up to the employee to show that the manage-
ment-proffered explanation was pretextual, which is an extremely diffi-
cult task for any employee.
After Perry and Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court again addressed the
public employment freedom of speech issue in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District.' Bessie Givhan, a junior high English
teacher, argued that she was terminated as a result of demands involving
employment policies and practices at the school, which Givhan perceived
to be racially discriminatory in purpose and effect.95 Her employer ar-
gued that the demands were "'petty and unreasonable"' and made in an
"'insulting,"' "'hostile,'" "'loud,"' and "'arrogant"' manner.96 "After a two-
day bench trial, the [d]istrict [c]ourt concluded that the 'primary reason
for the school district's failure to renew [Givhan's] contract was her criti-
cism of the policies and practices of the school district.' 97 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, finding that "because [Givhan] had privately expressed
her complaints and opinions to the principal, her expression was not
protected under the First Amendment."99 In reversing, the Supreme
Court held that a public employee does not forfeit "his protection against
governmental abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides to express
his views privately rather than publicly."99 Exclaiming that Perry and
Mt. Healthy involved public expressions by employees, the Court illus-
trated an important difference in Givhan:
Although the First Amendment's protection of government employees extends
to private as well as public expression, striking the Pickering balance in each
context may involve different considerations. When a teacher speaks publicly, it is
generally the content of his statements that must be assessed to determine wheth-
er they "in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily
duties in the classroom or ... interfered with the regular operations of the
schools generally." Private expression, however, may in some situations bring
additional factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government employee per-
92. See id. (footnote onitted).
93. See id. at 287.
94. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
95. See id. at 411-13.
96. See id. at 412 (quoting petitioner).
97. Id. at 412-13 (quoting App. to Petition for Cert. 35a).
98. Id. at 413 (emphasis added) (citing Ayers v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist.,
555 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1977)), vacated, 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
99. See id. at 414.
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sonally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional
efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee's message
but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered."5
A. Connick v. Myers: "Thresholds" and Matters of Public Concern.
In 1983, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision involving First
Amendment rights of public employee speech. In Connick v. Myers,'
an Assistant District Attorney lost her job as a result of a questionnaire
she circulated."° She was discharged and subsequently sought relief un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "contending that her employment was wrongfully
terminated because she had exercised her constitutionally-protected right
of free speech.""3 The district court held that the questionnaire in-
volved a matter of public concern and that the State had not demon-
strated that the survey "adversely affected" the operations of the District
Attorney's Office."° The Fifth Circuit affirmed."0 The Supreme Court
reversed."°
The Connick Court noted that the lower courts "got off on the wrong
foot" in finding that "'the issues presented in the questionnaire ... [were]
matters of public importance and concern."" 7 According to the Court,
in all previous First Amendment cases on point, before and after
Pickering "[tihe issue was whether government employees could be
prevented or 'chilled' by the fear of discharge from joining political par-
ties and other associations" or from speaking on matters of public con-
cern."° However, when employee speech did not relate "to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community, government of-
ficials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intru-
sive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." 9
Accordingly, the Court held:
100. Id. at 415 n.4 (italics added) (citations omitted).
101. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
102. See id. at 141; supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
103. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
104. See Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 759 (E.D. La. 1981), affd, 654 F.2d
719 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
105. See Myers v. Connick, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
106. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
107. Id. at 143 (quoting Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 758).
108. See id. at 144-45.
109. See id. at 146.
[WIhen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern,
but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which
to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly
in reaction to the employee's behavior." °
The Court observed that its responsibility "is to ensure that citizens are
not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the govern-
ment.'"" This, in turn "does not require a grant of immunity for em-
ployee grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do
not work for the state."". In determining whether an employee's speech
addresses a matter of public concern, one must examine the "content,
form, and context" of the statement as a whole."' Thus, according to
Justice White's majority opinion, "[t]o presume that all matters which
transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean
that virtually every remark-and certainly every criticism directed at a
public official-would plant the seed of a constitutional case.""'
In reviewing the content, form, and context of the questionnaire at
issue, the Connick Court simply concluded that the employee's questions
were "mere extensions" of the dispute regarding her transfer, and the
questions were not "of public import in evaluating the... District Attor-
ney as an elected official," nor did she "seek to inform the public that the
District Attorney's [Oiffice" was not operating properly."' However, ac-
cording to Justice White, one of the employee's questions did involve a
matter of public concern."6 Question number eleven of the question-
naire asked fellow employees if they "ever feel pressured to work in po-
litical campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates."" 7 The
Court cited recently decided cases which concluded that official pressure
on employees to work on political campaigns may be coercion in viola-
tion of the constitution."8 Because the speech concerned a matter of
110. Id. at 147 (citation omitted).
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 147-48.
114. Id. at 149.
115. See id. at 148.
116. See id. at 149.
117. See id.
118. See id. (citing Branti v. Finke, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347 (1976)). On another occasion, the Court stated that "there is a demonstrated
interest in this country that government service should depend upon meritorious per-
formance rather than political service." Id. (citing United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Pub. Workers of Am. v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)).
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public concern, the Court concluded that the Pickering balance test must
be conducted.'
After discussing the facts surrounding the questionnaire, the Court
concluded that "Myers' questionnaire touched upon matters of public
concern in only a most limited sense" because it was effectively "an em-
ployee grievance concerning internal office policy."2 ' Accordingly, the
Court found that any First Amendment interest that Myers had did "not
require that Connick tolerate action which he reasonably believed would
disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working
relationships." 2 ' Therefore, the Court determined that the First Amend-
ment was not offended by Myers' dismissal."
However, Justice Brennan stated in his dissent that the survey did
involve matters of public concern.1" Additionally, he concluded that the
showing was inadequate to establish that the speech might impair work-
ing relationships." Therefore, according to Justice Brennan, mere ap-
prehension was insufficient to justify suppression."
In 1987, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to address the
issue of speech as a matter of public concern in Rankin v.
McPherson.26 Rankin involved Ardith McPherson, a nineteen-year-old
black woman on a probationary appointment as a clerical employee of
the Harris County, Texas, Constable's Office. 2 7 In response to the as-
sassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan, she was overhead stat-
ing, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him."' The employee
was fired for her remarks." In applying the required Connick analysis,
the Court concluded that the statement actually dealt with a matter of
public concern." In defending this amazing result, the Court reasoned
that the "statement was made in the course of a conversation addressing
the policies of the President's administration." 3' Further, "[i]t came on
119. See id. at 150.
120. See id. at 154.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 169 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 166-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. See 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
127. See id. at 380.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 382.
130. See id. at 386.
131. See id.
the heels of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of
heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of the President."1"2
The speech also did not involve a threat to kill the President. 1" Accord-
ing to the Court, "[tihe inappropriate or controversial character of a
statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of
public concern. 'Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and ... may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."'1 4
After finding that the employee's statements touched on a matter of pub-
lic concern, the Court applied the Pickering balancing test and conclud-
ed that the State's interest was negligible and that the employee's speech
should be provided First Amendment protection.
135
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor, attacked the majority's find-
ings on the issue of whether the employee's speech addressed a matter
of public concern. 13 Justice Scalia, reflecting what we believe is clearly
the better view, reasoned that McPherson's statement was "'a far cry
from the question by the Assistant District Attorney in Connick"' regard-
ing pressure to work in political campaigns.137 It was also different
from the letter written by the public school teacher in Pickering criticizing the
Board of Education's proposals for financing school construction[;] .. from the
legislative testimony of a state college teacher in Perry v. Sindermann .... advo-
cating that a particular college be elevated to 4-year status; [and] from the memo-
randum given by a teacher to a radio station in Mt. Healthy City Board of Educa-
tion v. Doyle,... dealing with a teacher dress and appearance.'"
In Scalia's view, McPherson's statement was different from those the
Court "previously held entitled to no First Amendment protection even in
the nonemployment context-including assassination threats against the
President (which are illegal under [federal law])."'39 According to
Scalia, a "statement lying so near the category of completely unprotected
speech cannot fairly be viewed as lying within the 'heart' of the First
Amendment's protection; it lies within the category of speech that can
neither be characterized as speech on matters of public concern nor
properly subject to criminal penalties."4 ' McPherson crossed the line,
132. Id.
133. See id. at 386-87.
134. Id. at 387 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
135. See id. at 392.
136. See id. at 394-401 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
149 (1983)).
138. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
139. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 397-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in Scalia's view, when she "stopped explicitly criticizing the President's
policies and expressed a desire that he be assassinated."' In Justice
Scalia's words:
The Court reaches the opposite conclusion only by distorting the concept of "pub-
lic concern." It does not explain how a statement expressing approval of a serious
and violent crime-assassination of the President-can possibly fall within that
category. It simply rehearses the "context" of McPherson's statement, which as we
have already seen is irrelevant here, and then concludes that because of that con-
text, and because the statement "came on the heels of a news bulletin regarding
what is certainly a matter of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of
the President," the statement "plainly dealt with a matter of public concern." I
cannot respond to this progression of reasoning except to say I do not understand
it. Surely the Court does not mean to adopt the reasoning of the court below,
which was that McPherson's statement was "addressed to a matter of public con-
cern" within the meaning of Connick because the public would obviously be "con-
cerned" about the assassination of the President. That is obviously untenable: The
public would be "concerned" about a statement threatening to blow up the local
federal building or demanding a $1 million extortion payment, yet that kind of
"public concern" does not entitle such a statement to any First Amendment pro-
tection at all.'
B. Waters v. Churchill: Factfinding Procedures and the
First Amendment.
In Waters v. Churchill," the Court addressed the firing of Cheryl
Churchill, a nurse at a public hospital in Illinois, for allegedly making
statements to co-workers during a work break.' The contents of
Churchill's statements were disputed." After conducting an investiga-
tion, her employer concluded that during this conversation Churchill,
assigned to the hospital's obstetrics department, told a fellow nurse, who
had been considering a transfer to the obstetrics department, of the poor
working conditions in obstetrics.'46 Churchill further stated that
management's training policy was going to "'ruin' the hospital."47 Short-
141. See id. at 398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
143. 511 U.S. 661 (1994). See generally Edward J. Velazquez, Comment, Waters v.
ChurchilL- Government-Employer Efficiency, Judicial Deference, and the Abandonment
of Public-Employee Free Speech by the Supreme Court, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1055
(1995) (discussing Waters).
144. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 664.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 665.
147. See id. at 666 (quoting Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1118 (1992)).
ly after the conversation, the nurse considering the transfer decided not
to transfer."' In her suit against the hospital, Churchill claimed she was
discharged in violation of her First Amendment rights.' The district
court granted summary judgment to the hospital, finding that neither the
hospital's nor Churchill's version of the conversation was protected un-
der Connick."' According to the court, no matter "whose story was ac-
cepted, the speech was not on a matter of public concern, and even if it
was on a matter of public concern, its potential for disruption nonethe-
less stripped it of First Amendment protection."191
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that "the speech, viewed in light
most favorable to her, was protected public speech under the Connick
test.""2 Thus, according to the circuit court, "'the hospital's [alleged]
violation of state nursing regulations as well as the quality and level of
nursing care"' was a matter of public concern."3 However, the circuit
court ruled that the inquiry for the court must turn upon Churchill's
actual speech, not upon the employer's interpretation thereof." There-
fore, according to the Seventh Circuit, "[i]f the employer chooses to
discharge the employee without sufficient knowledge of her protected
speech as a result of an inadequate investigation into the employee's con-
duct,... the employer runs the risk of eventually being required to rem-
edy any wrongdoing whether it was deliberate or accidental."""
A conflict existed among the holdings of the Seventh, Eighth,8 6
Tenth,' and Eleventh"8 Circuits."9 The issue, according to the Su-
preme Court's plurality decision, was as follows: "Should the court apply
the Connick test to the speech as the government employer found it to
148. See id. at 665.
149. See id. at 667.
150. See id.; 731 F. Supp. 311, 321-22 (C.D. Ill. 1990).
151. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 667 (emphasis added).
152. See id. (citing Churchill v. Water, 977 F.2d 1114, 1122 (7th Cir. 1992)).
153. See id. (quoting Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1122).
154. See id.
155. Id. at 667-68 (quoting Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1127).
156. See, e.g., Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding
that there is no liability if there is an "existence of reasonable grounds for the belief
formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith
belief").
157. See, e.g., Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 867 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding
that there is no liability because a "reasonable police chief should have been on
notice that it would be a violation of the First Amendment to terminate a police offi-
cer who wrote a letter").
158. See, e.g., Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir.
1992) (holding that there is no liability because "official's actions do not violate clear-
ly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
159. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 668.
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be, or should it ask the jury to determine the facts for itself?"' ° Writing
for a sharply divided Court, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg, noted that the Court's
prior decisions "establish a basic First Amendment principle [that]
[g]overnment action based on protected speech may under some circum-
stances violate the First Amendment even if the government actor hon-
estly believes the speech is unprotected." 6' However, according to Jus-
tice O'Connor, "not every procedure that may safeguard protected speech
is constitutionally mandated."'62
On the issue of due process, Justice O'Connor, speaking for the plural-
ity, held that the "propriety of a proposed procedure must turn on the
particular context in which the question arises-on the cost of the pro-
cedure and the relative magnitude and constitutional significance of the
risks it would decrease and increase."" Further,
to evaluate these factors here we have to return to the issue we dealt with in
Connick and in the cases that came before it: What is it about the government's
role as employer that gives it a freer hand in regulating the speech of its employ-
ees than it has in regulating the speech of the public at large?"
Based upon its own analysis of the Connick test involving the governm-
ent's interest in "achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possi-
ble,"" Justice O'Connor found that the Seventh Circuit had failed to
give sufficient weight to the government's interest in what she called "ef-
ficient employment decisionmaking."' Justice O'Connor further noted
that:
The problem with the Court of Appeals' approach-under which the facts to
which the Connick test is applied are determined by the judicial factfmder-is
that it would force the government employer to come to its factual conclusions
through procedures that substantially mirror the evidentiary rules used in court.
The government manager would have to ask not what conclusions she, as an
experienced professional, can draw from the circumstances, but rather what con-
clusions a jury would later draw. If she relies on hearsay, or on what she knows
about the accused employee's character, she must be aware that this evidence
might not be usable in court. If she knows one party is, in her personal experi-
ence, more credible than another, she must realize that the jury will not share that
personal experience. If she thinks the alleged offense is so egregious that it is
160. See id.
161. See id. at 669.
162. Id. at 670.
163. Id. at 671.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 675.
166. See id.
proper to discipline the accused employee even though the evidence is ambigu-
ous, she must consider that a jury might decide the other way.
But employers, public and private, often do rely on hearsay, on past similar
conduct, on their personal knowledge of people's credibility, and on other factors
that the judicial process ignores. Such reliance may sometimes be the most effec7
tive way for the employer to avoid future recurrences of improper and disruptive
conduct. "'
Justice O'Connor cautioned that, when applying the Connick test,
courts must also "consider... the reasonableness of the employer's
conclusions.""6 Accordingly, courts are to decide whether the decision-
maker's conclusions are made in good faith, rather than as a pretext.
69
Moreover, Justice O'Connor took the analysis one step further, holding
that the findings of the decisionmaker must be reasonable." ° According
to Justice O'Connor:
If an employment action is based on what an employee supposedly said, and a
reasonable supervisor would recognize that there is a substantial likelihood that
what was actually said was protected, the manager must tread with a certain
amount of care. This need not be the care with which trials, with their rules of
evidence and procedure, are conducted. It should, however, be the care that a
reasonable manager would use before making an employment decision-dis-
charge, suspension, reprimand, or whatever else-of the sort involved in the par-
ticular case."'
Justice O'Connor concluded that "the possibility of inadvertently pun-
ishing someone for exercising her First Amendment rights make such
care necessary."'' Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, if Churchill's
supervisors really did believe the story of the witnesses and fired Chur-
chill because of that belief, the hospital did not violate Churchill's First
Amendment right of free speech.'73 Therefore, the Court's plurality re-
manded the case on the question of whether Churchill was actually fired
because of those statements, as found by the supervisor, or for some
other reason.'74
167. Id. at 675-76.
168. See id. at 677.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 677-78.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 678 (acknowledging agreement with Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
that such care is normally not constitutionally required unless employee has a pro-
tected property interest in his or her job).
173. See id. at 679-80. Justice O'Connor found that if this was truly their belief, it
would have been entirely reasonable. See id. at 680. Moreover, under the Connick
test, according to Justice O'Connor, Churchill's speech was unprotected either as not
involving a matter of public concern or as being potentially disruptive and thus out-
weighing whatever First Amendment value it might have had. See id. at 680-81.
174. See id. at 682.
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Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy
and Thomas, pointed out that under the Court's prior cases, "public em-
ployees who ... lack a protected property interest in their jobs, are not
entitled to any sort of a hearing before dismissal."' According to Jus-
tice Scalia, under the opinion set forth by Justice O'Connor:
[I]f a reason happens to be given, and if the reason relates to speech and "there is
a substantial likelihood that what was actually said was protected," (whatever that
means),.., an investigation to assure that the speech was not the sort protected
by the First Amendment must be conducted-after which, presumably, the dis-
missal can still proceed even if the speech was not what the employer had
thought it was, so long as it was not speech on an issue of public importance. 7'
The approach proposed by Justice O'Connor "provides more questions
than answers, subjecting public employers to intolerable uncertainty. " "r
"It remains entirely unclear what the employer's judgment must be based
on."" What is clear is that allowing public management to dismiss an
employee based on what it believes the employee actually said, the inter-
pretation of which will be based on its own fact-finding process, does
not bode well for public employees desiring to speak out on what they
believe are matters of concern.
1H. RECENT COURT DECISIONS: FACTS IN SEARCH OF
STANDARDS AND THEORY
The Connick Court made it clear that "speech on public issues occu-
pies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is
entitled to special protection."'79 Thus, under Connick, if a public
employee's speech cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech
on a matter of public concern, no Pickering balancing test is neces-
sary." ° As pointed out by Justice White in Connick, when employee
speech "cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community, government officials should
175. See id. at 688 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing Board of Re-
gents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972)).
176. See id. at 688 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
177. See id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 693 (Scalia, J., concurring).
179. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1982) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)).
180. See id. at 146 (citations omitted).
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight
by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."''
Applying the Connick, Pickering, and Mt. Healthy standard on a case-
by-case basis has proven to be an arduous task for most reviewing
courts. It is even more arduous for employment lawyers rendering advice
to clients. Over the past two decades, reviewing courts have produced a
number of inconsistent rulings dealing with public employees, particular-
ly teachers, police officers, and other low-ranking governmental officials.
The vast number of inconsistencies arise out of the individualized appli-
cations of the threshold "public concern" test articulated in Connick. For
the most part, these inconsistencies can be traced to the judicial sub-
jective valuing process required under Connick. As Professor Tribe
notes, courts must now make "subjective, content-based determinations
of the social importance of speech."82 What is created are "doctrinal
cubbyholes" depending to the extent to which a court desires to think
conceptually about Connick's time, manner, and place criteria and their
relationship to the Pickering balancing test.' What speech is "impor-
tant" and deserving of protection and what speech is not? Is the determi-
nation ever capable of an objective test? When should the judiciary give
deference to management's judgment regarding a claim of organizational
camaraderie? Four separate (but not mutually exclusive) approaches
emerge.
A. The 'Avoidance" Approach
The cleanest and least demanding approach taken by some courts in
dealing with the public concern issue is simple avoidance. These courts
(like many labor arbitrators) merely assume a positive reading on the
threshold Connick test and turn directly to a Pickering balance. Argu-
ably, this approach is taken only when the Pickering balance is resolved
in favor of the employer, thereby negating any need to consider the form,
content, or context of the speech in question.
Illustrative of the "avoidance approach" is Waldau v. Coughlin.'" In
Waldau, although the court noted that the employee's speech was on a
matter of public concern, Judge Oberdorfer stated that the "speech for
which plaintiff was terminated is not constitutionally protected because
the Postal Service's interest 'in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees' outweighs plaintiffs 'interest
181. See id.
182. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 12-18, at 931 n.15
(2d ed. 1988).
183. See id.
184. No. 95-1151, 1997 WL 161958 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 1997).
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as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.""85 Accord-
ing to the court, it therefore was unnecessary to determine whether the
speech was a matter of public concern."
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Shahar v. Bowers,'87 a First
Amendment freedom of association case, ignored Connick and declared:
Pickering balancing is never a precise mathematical process: it is a method of
analysis by which a court compares the relative values of the things before it. A
person often knows that "x" outweighs "y" even without first determining exactly
what either "x" or "y" weighs. And it is this common experience that illustrates
the workings of a Pickering balance."
In a footnote; the court rationalized that it was "not the first court to
assume the existence of a right and, then, to go on to apply the
Pickering balancing test, taking into account the assumed right.""s
The Eighth Circuit, in Barnard v. Jackson County,"9 took the same
approach.' In Barnard, the court justified disregarding Connick by
simply declaring that "[b]ecause we believe that the second component
of the above [inquiry] resolves the issues..., we assume without decid-
ing that Barnard's speech with the Star touched upon matters of public
concern, and we proceed to the Pickering balancing test."8 2
The Supreme Court took a similar approach in Waters v. Churchill."
In Waters, the Court held that under Connick, the First Amendment did
not protect a worker's comments relating to a particular department at
work."9 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, did not address
whether Churchill's speech touched a matter of public concern because,
"[a]s a matter of law, [the] potential disruptiveness [of her speech] was
enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value the speech might
have had."'95
185. See id. at *4 (source of internal quote omitted in original).
186. See id. at *4.
187. 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
188. See id. at 1106.
189. Id. at 1106 n.19.
190. See id. at 1233.
191. 43 F.3d 1218, 1233 (8th Cir. 1995).
192. See id. at 1223.
193. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
194. See id. at 679-82.
195. See id. at 681.
B. All Speech is Protected to an Extent: "Exclusionary Analysis
Approach"
Other courts, in an attempt to face the difficult application of Connick
head on, view the Connick test as an attempt to exclude public employee
speech that is not a matter of public concern from First Amendment
protection.'" Based on this exclusionary interpretation, these courts
presume that all speech has some First Amendment protection. '97 Ac-
cording to these courts, Connick was merely the Supreme Court's at-
tempt to categorically remove speech that dealt with purely private work-
place grievances.98 Thus, even though virtually all speech has some
form of First Amendment protection, Connick implicitly requires that
public employee speech that is not a matter of public concern should be
excluded from First Amendment protection. 199
This approach is evident in Berger v. Battaglia.2 "° In Berger, the
Fourth Circuit had to determine whether the City of Baltimore could
condition a police officer's employment on the officer's compliance with
the city's order to cease his controversial off-duty "blackface" perfor-
mances, which included impersonation of the late singer Al Jolson.2"'
The officer alleged that the city's actions violated his free speech rights
under the First Amendment.2"2 The court began its analysis, noting that
"[t]his particular controversy does not fit too neatly within the paradigm-
atic factual pattern out of which the 'Pickering test' has developed."2"
The court distinguished this case from the usual Pickering-type case be-
cause the employee's speech was not critical of or in disagreement with
governmental operations, and
the governmental interest assertedly threatened by the speech was not internal
employment relationships and operations. Instead the speech was a form of artis-
tic expression wholly unrelated in content to the public employer or its opera-
tions, and the threat it assertedly posed to employer interests was not internal
disruption by the speech itself, but external disruption by third persons reacting
to the speech.2"
The issue of whether this artistic expression rises to a matter of public
concern is of particular interest. According to the Berger court:
196. See Boring v. Boncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1996);
Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985).
197. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1477; Berger, 779 F.2d at 999.
198. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1480; Berger, 779 F.2d at 998-99.
199. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
200. 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985).
201. See id. at 993.
202. See id. at 996.
203. Id. at 997.
204. See id.
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Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny-particularly Connick-make it plain
that the "public concern" or "community interest" inquiry is better designed-and
more concerned-to identify a narrow spectrum of employee speech that is not
entitled even to qualified protection than it is to set outer limits on all that is. The
principle that emerges is that al! public employee speech that by content is within
the general protection of the First Amendment is entitled to at least qualified
protection against public employer chilling action except that which, realistically
viewed, is of purely "personal concern" to the employee-most typically, a private
personnel grievance. That is to say, the purpose of the inquiry is to prevent
turning every public employee expression of private grievance into a constitution-
al case, while at the same time enforcing the new dispensation, dating back at
least to Keyishian v. Board of Regents, that by accepting public employment a
citizen does not absolutely forfeit his first amendment right to express himself
freely upon "any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community."
The focus is therefore upon whether the "public" or the "community" is likely to
be truly concerned with or interested in the particular expression, or whether it is
more properly viewed as essentially a "private" matter between employer and
employee."5
Applying this rationale, the court determined that the officer's perfor-
mances "were not purely personal expressions of no concern to the com-
munity. Rather, they constituted speech upon a matter of obvious public
interest to those considerable segments of the community who willingly
attended and sometimes paid to see and hear them.""' The court fur-
ther noted the fact that "the content was sheer entertainment-pre-
sumably neutral as to any political or even social views-does not of
course take them outside First Amendment protection."2' 7
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit again decided not to apply the
Connick test in Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education."' In
the panel decision in Boring, the issue was whether a high school drama
teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when she was trans-
ferred to a middle school as a result of her selection of a controversial
play that was to be performed by high school drama students.2" The
205. Id. at 998-99 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
206. See id. at 999.
207. Id.
208. 98 F.3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1996), vacated by, 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998). In Feb-
ruary 1998, shortly before final editing of this Article, in a severely divided decision,
the Fourth Circuit Court setting en banc reversed the panel's decision. The full
court's majority opinion found the plaintiffs selection of the play Independence, even
though it may have amounted to speech, was not a matter of public concern, and
therefore was not "protected speech." Finding that the makeup of the curriculum
should be entrusted to the local school authorities, rather than to the teachers, the
full court's majority found that plaintiffs speech was nothing more than an ordinary
employment dispute.
209. See id. at 1476. The play, "'Independence,' is a drama that 'powerfully de-
School District argued that because the teacher selected the play in her
role as a teacher, she failed to satisfy the "public concern" element of
Connick.' °
In addressing the issue, the panel's majority acknowledged that "the
Connick 'public concern' analysis simply does not provide a very useful
tool when analyzing a teacher's classroom speech."2 . According to the
panel's majority, "the [very] essence of a teacher's role in the class-
room.., is to discuss with students issues of public concern."2"2 Thus,
the teacher's classroom comments almost always touch upon "matter[s]
of political, social or other concern to the community."2"3 Consequently,
this teacher's choice of play, which "involv[ed] a variety of social themes,
meets this criterion.
2 4
In discussing Berger, the panel's majority noted that the teacher's se-
lection of a particular play, or, for that matter, "a teacher's choice of a
film or course material, [was not] analogous to private personnel griev-
ances;" therefore, such selection touched upon matters of public con-
cern.2"5 Moreover, the panel's majority rejected the Board of
Education's argument that to obtain the protection of Connick, "a teach-
er must show that she expressed her views in her role as a private citi-
zen, rather than as a government employee. 21 6 The panel's majority rea-
soned that to hold otherwise "would mean that a teacher lacks all First
Amendment protection whenever she teaches, because by definition she
is then acting in her role as a government employee.""7 Moreover, the
panel's majority noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized
that educational institutions occupy a unique place in First Amendment
jurisprudence."2 1  The panel's majority declared that "the notion that
pict[ed] the dynamics within a dysfunctional, single-parent family-a divorced mother
and three daughters; one a lesbian, another pregnant with an illegitimate child.' The
students planned to perform the play . . . in a state competition." Id. (source of in-
ternal quote omitted in original).
210. See id. at 1479.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1480.
213. See id. (applying Connick's broad definition of "public concern" to the
teacher's role in the classroom).
214. See id.
215. See id. at 1479.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 1480 (emphasis added); see also Bausworth v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist.,
986 F.2d 1197, 1199 (8th Cir. 1993) (discussing a school bus driver's responses to
questions by parents concerning the school district's plan to charge for transportation
costs and holding that even though the contents of her response related to a matter
of public concern, she spoke in the course of acting as a school district employee
engaged in a job-related task and therefore was without First Amendment protection).
218. Id. at'1480.
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teachers have no First Amendment right when teaching, or that the gov-
ernment can censor teacher speech without restriction, is 'fantastic' and
stands in direct contrast to an imposing line of precedent."219
The Seventh Circuit took a similar exclusionary approach in Swank v.
Smart.22 In Swank, a police officer was discharged after taking a
minor female on a late-night motorcycle ride during which the two dis-
cussed the girl's courses at college, the motorcycle, her former boyfriend,
her opinion of Carthage, Illinois (the town in which they lived), and oth-
er topics.22 ' After he was discharged, the officer claimed that his con-
versation was protected under the First Amendment.2z Writing for the
court, Judge Posner reasoned that the conversation between Swank and
the co-ed on the motorcycle "was speech in the literal sense, but not
speech protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment."
21
In Judge Posner's opinion, "casual chit-chat between two persons or oth-
erwise confined to a small social group is unrelated, or largely so, to the
marketplace, and is not protected."2" While such conversation may be
important to its participants, it does not advance "knowledge,... cultur-
al expression, and the other objectives, values, and consequences of the
speech that is protected by the First Amendment."22 With respect to
the assertion that all speech touches some aspect of public concern, the
court found that "[tihat the kernel of expression which can be found 'in
almost every activity a person undertakes-for example, walking down
the street, or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall ... is not suffi-
cient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amend-
ment."'226 While acknowledging that "discussion of motorcycles and for-
mer boyfriends can contribute to the marketplace of ideas," Judge
Posner found that the conversation at issue was "idle or flirtatious in
character," and "too remote from the political rally, the press conference,
219. Id. (citing Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Va. 1996)); see also
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (reaffirm-
ing the rule that teachers and schools are accorded First Amendment protection);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (same); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (commenting on the need to allow students and
teachers the freedom to inquire about any issue).
220. 898 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990).
221. See id. at 1249-50.
222. See id. at 1250.
223. See id. (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 1251.
225. See id.
226. See id. (quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23 (1989)).
the demonstration, the theater, or other familiar emporia of the market-
place of ideas to activate the guarantees of the First Amendment."27
C. Applying Connick to the evidence record: The speaker's motive as a
determinative element.
The vast majority of cases applying the Connick test turn to a case-by-
case, subjective factual analysis which appears to focus mainly upon the
motives of the speaker in making the speech. Why did the speaker utter
the words at issue? Similar inconsistent results are produced.
For example, in Campbell v. Towse,228 an Alton, Illinois police lieu-
tenant was suspended for writing a letter to the Chief critical of the po-
lice department's policies and management style.229 The Seventh Circuit
discussed the Connick standard and the court's obligation to determine
whether the officer's letter "addressed a matter of general concern to the
public, rather than being wholly centered on a personal dispute or
grievances with his employer. " "° The defendants in Campbell argued
that the lieutenant's motive in writing the memorandum was entirely
personal in nature-hoping apparently that he would be relieved of his
position-because he did not seek a public airing of his views and be-
cause the matter was one more analogous to a personal grievanceY
Setting forth the tests as a focus on content, form, and context, in light
of the record as a whole, the court added that the speaker's motive, al-
though not dispositive, "may well serve to clarify the central point of his
expression." 2 The court said that the speaker's motive would "assist
us in determining whether he sought to air his criticism of the C.O.P.S.
program because he was concerned as a citizen about the weaknesses he
perceived in that program, or whether the central point of Campbell's
speech was instead 'to further some purely private interest' arising out of
his employment relation with the Department."'
With this version of the Connick test in hand, the court found that the
lieutenant's letter, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, was
not intended as a personal grievance.' The court found that the lieu-
tenant disagreed with "the wisdom of bringing the ... program to Alton,
and its efficacy in serving the nonminority members of the Alton commu-
227. See id.
228. 99 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 1996).
229. See id. at 823.
230. See id. at 827.
231. See id. at 828.
232. See id. at 827.
233. See id. (quoting Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985)).
234. See id. at 828.
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nity."235 The court based its determination of the lieutenant's intent on
the fact that the lieutenant could have aired his views publicly to gain
some advantage but, instead, sought only to distance himself from what
he felt was a failure by giving up his recent promotion.36 Thus, he
wrote the letter intending it to reach these ends.27 According to the
court, "the central point of Campbell's speech was aimed at a matter of
public rather than private concern within the meaning of Connick and
Pickering."238
Other appellate courts also apply the Connick test with a weighted
"motive-related" element. For example, in Havekost v. United States
Department of the Navy,3 9 the Ninth Circuit noted that in applying
Connick, the "critical inquiry is whether the employee spoke in order to
bring wrongdoing to light or merely to further some purely private in-
terest."24 ° Moreover, in Hartman v. Board of Trustees of Community
College District No. 508,241 the Seventh Circuit noted "[w]hether these
statements are directed toward a matter of public concern depends in
part on the motivation behind them."24 2 Thus, according to the court,
"even if an issue is one of public concern in a general sense, as sexual
harassment surely is, still we must ask whether the speaker raised the
issue because it is matter of public concern or whether, instead, the
issue was raised to 'further some purely private interest.'1" 3 The court
added that
[wihen the speaker's motives are mixed, as often they are, the speech will not be
found to raise a matter of public concern if 'the overriding reason for the speech,'
as determined by its content, form, and context, appears to have been related to
the speaker's personal interests as a employee.A4
Under this approach to Connick, the weight to be given to a speaker's
motive varies depending upon the court. In Belk v. Minocqua,245 an em-
ployer fired an employee for threatening to file what appeared on the
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. 925 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1991).
240. See id. at 318 (citing Brever v. Hart, 909 F.2d 1035, 1039 n.5 (7th Cir. 1990)).
241. 4 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 1993).
242. Id. at 471 (citing Colburn v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 586 (7th Cir.
1992)).
243. Id. (quoting Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 1987)).
244. Id. at 471-72 (quoting Colburn, 973 F.2d at 587).
245. 858 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1988).
surface merely to be a personal grievance.2 The court stated that "'al-
though the point or motive behind an employee's speech is relevant in
determining whether matters of public concern are implicated by that
speech, motive alone is not dispositive."'247 The court held that the
employee's threat "revealed not only that the Town Board had been pay-
ing more compensation to the incumbent... than the residents of
Minocqua had authorized, but also that the occupancy of those two offic-
es by the same individual was proscribed by a state statute."2" Thus, by
downplaying the speaker's motive and emphasizing the content of the
speech in question, the court concluded that the speech touched on a
matter of public concern.249
On the other hand, in Barnes v. McDowell,2" the Sixth Circuit re-
versed the emphasis and downplayed the importance of the content of
the speech.25' The court stated "[t]he mere fact that public monies and
government efficiency are related to the subject of a public employee's
speech do not, by themselves, qualify that speech as being addressed to
a matter of public concern."252 The court went on to find the speech in
that case, even though it involved the charging of corruption in a govern-
mental agency, was "nothing more than examples 'of the quintessential
employee beef: management has acted incompetently.'
25
A recent case reported by the Seventh Circuit illustrates the problems
inherent in the "speaker's motive" approach. In Wales v. Board of Educa-
tion of Community Unit School District 300,2' a teacher's contract
was not renewed allegedly because she sent her principal a letter critical
246. See id. at 1263.
247. See id. (quoting Breg v. Hunter, 854 F.2d 238, 242-43 (7th Cir. 1988)).
248. See id. at 1263. In an interesting footnote, the court noted that matters of
public concern are rarely so easily discernable. See id. at 1263 n.7. Personal issues
do not necessarily "assume a larger, public dimension." See id. Thus, plaintiffs should
do the following:
In assessing whether the speech touches upon a matter of public concern, it
is important not to equate the public's curiosity about a matter with the
matter having societal ramifications. People may be interested in any number
of aspects of the lives of public officials and employees, but that does not
mean that such matters have societal ramifications. Conversely, the public
may be extremely apathetic about certain matters of public concern ....
Id. (quoting Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 316-17 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc)).
249. See id. at 1264.
250. 848 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1988).
251. See id. at 734-35.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 735 (quoting Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985)).
254. 120 F.3d 82 (7th Cir. 1997).
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of the principal's policies and management style.21 In a well-reasoned
opinion, Judge Frank Easterbrook noted:
Cases such as this illuminate a problem posed by Pickering. Speech has multiple
objectives. One statement can address issues of both public and private concern.
An employer may respond to either or both of these facets of the speech.
Pickering expresses optimism that courts can separate one kind of speech (and
one kind of response) from the other at low cost, and then permit the public em-
ployer to react when speech goes "too far" (or becomes "to disruptive") while pro-
tecting speech that has net public benefits. How this is to be done Pickering does
not say. When both speaker and employer have (or appear to have) mixed mo-
tives, the task is intractable. And the cost can be substantial-by which we mean
not the monetary costs litigants bear themselves, or the time the judicial system
must divert from serving the needs of other litigants, or the risk of error, but the
opportunity costs that will be borne by the public when public servants seek to
avoid litigation. Exchanges of views between employees and their supervisors are
routine-especially at schools, which deal in expression. Every teacher has, or
easily can gin up, a claim that speech made a difference, as often it should. What
people say reflects or presages what they do, and employers (public and private
alike) therefore may properly consider job-related speech when making decisions.
Pickering and Connick v. Myers, say that speech about a topic of public concern
may be a ground of adverse action only if the speech is disruptive, but non-disrup-
tive speech can be highly informative about how well a given person fits a partic-
ular slot.
Rational employers routinely consider speech .... Because public employers
do, or can be made to appear to, react to non-disruptive speech, good and bad
employees alike can threaten to impose costs on public employers who demote or
fire them .... Faced with both a threat to the pocketbook and the substantial
diversion of time from the principal task at hand... many a supervisor wil let
things be. Then the people who suffer are the children, deprived of the best edu-
cation the school district can provide. That was not the goal of the Supreme Court
in Pickering, but it is an inevitable consequence; it is not possible to protect pub-
lic employees' right to speak their minds without creating incentives that threaten
the quality of services agencies deliver to the public.
D. Coming Full Circle: Connick and "Labels of Distinction."
Finally, an aggressive challenge to the traditional Connick analysis has
emerged, at least in the Seventh Circuit. The fourth approach, highlighted
in a case reported by the Seventh Circuit, distinguishes the matter of
public concern test as a mere "label of the distinction" between "levels of
first amendment protection." 27 This approach seems to take the
255. See id. at 82.
256. Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted).
257. See Eberhardt v. O'Malley, 117 F.3d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 1994).
Connick analysis full circle by returning the matter of public concern
issue back into a factor to be considered in the Pickering balance.".
By returning the public concern test to a Pickering balance, a pre-
Connick analysis is taken.
Illustrative is Eberhardt v. O'Malley.59 In Eberhardt, an Assistant
State's Attorney working in Cook County, Illinois was fired because he
wrote a novel involving fictional prosecutors and other individuals in the
criminal justice system.2" According to Eberhardt, "all characters and
locations in the manuscript were a consolidation of persons and places
Eberhardt had become familiar with during his careers as a police officer
and a prosecutor."261
Judge Posner's lengthy reasoning is particularly interesting and worth
reprinting:
As we have already intimated, it is not the case that the only expression which
the First Amendment protects is expression that deals with "matters of public
concern," unless this formula is understood to mean any matter for which there is
potentially a public. The First Amendment protects entertainment as well as trea-
tises on politics and public administration .... The less serious, portentous, polit-
ical, significant the genre of expression, the less imposing the justification that the
government must put forth in order to be permitted to suppress the expression.
So Eberhardt's novel, whether or not it alleges wrongdoing or addresses matters
of public import in some word-important sense, presumptively is protected by the
First Amendment. It follows that his employer could not fire him for writing it
unless the employer had a reason-something that might rebut the presumption
of privilege. The employer could not gratuitously punish him for exercising free-
dom of speech. This is true even if-indeed, especially if-the protected expres-
sion has nothing to do with the employee's job or with the public interest in the
operation of his office. The less his speech has to do with the office, the less justi-
fication the office is likely to have to regulate it.
The elementary proposition that the government must be able to give a good
reason (how good we need not decide in this case) for wanting to deter protected
speech by attaching a sanction to it has been obscured by failure to consider the
context in which the courts have said that the public employee complaining of
infringement of his First Amendment rights must show that he was expressing
himself on matters of public rather than private concern. Those cases are con-
cerned not with drawing a line between different forms of protected speech-say,
charges of official malfeasance versus entertainment-but with distinguishing
between different levels of protection. Most of the speech in which people en-
gage-in Swank v. Smart, we gave the example of casual chitchat between a
policeman and a college coed to whom he was giving a ride on his motorcycle;
grousing to one's supervisor about the raise one didn't get is another example-is
so remote from the central purposes of the First Amendment that an employee
fired for such speech is not entitled to relief under that amendment. The
employer's interest in controlling such speech, meager as that interest may be, is
258. See id. at 1026-27.
259. 17 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1994).
260. See id. at 1024.
261. Id. at 1025.
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thought to outweigh the social interest in speech so remote from the core of the
First Amendment. The courts have had to separate speech that is not very
valuable socially from whistleblowing and other socially valuable expressive activ-
ities of public employees, and "matter of public concern" is the label of the dis-
tinction. But a novel is not like grousing about a raise. It is comfortably within the
protection of the amendment and this regardless of its subject matter or its rela-
tion to the author's employment."
E. What is the effect of speech within the context of an ongoing labor
dispute or formal grievance under a collective bargaining
agreement?
Unlike the private sector, courts appear unwilling to apply the balanc-
ing process to favor public-sector employee speech when made within
the context of a labor dispute, either in grievance adjustment or collec-
tive bargaining.
Brown v. Department of Transportation F.A.A.,2" a decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, applied both Pickering and
Connick and recognized "loyalty" as a valid managerial interest, even
within the context of a labor dispute.2 " In Brown, the Federal Aviation
Administration fired Brown, a supervisory air traffic control specialist,
for making comments to striking air traffic controllers.26 Although
Brown did not participate in the nationwide air controllers' strike (in-
deed, he worked a twelve-hour shift the first day of the strike), during
his off-duty hours Brown went to the local union hall and advised his
controllers that he was still working.2 " He also stated, "I wish you'd all
come back, 'cause I'm too tired and too old to be working these long
hours."267 He further stated, "I'm so happy that you're together. Stay to-
gether, please, because if you do, you'll win."2 The media broadcast
Brown's remarks nationwide that same evening. 9 The agency subse-
quently removed Brown from his position and the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board upheld the removal.27 On appeal, the court addressed
"whether Brown's speech was constitutionally protected," and if not,
262. Id. at 1026-27 (citations omitted).
263. 735 F.2d 543 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
264. See id. at 547-48.
265. See id. at 544.
266. See id. at 545.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. See id.
"whether a nexus existed between Brown's off-duty remarks ... and the
efficiency of the agency's operations."27'
With respect to the constitutional question, the court, citing Pickering,
stated that the test to be applied was "(1) whether Brown's speech ad-
dressed a matter of public concern and, if so, (2) whether the interest of
the agency in promoting the efficiency of the public service it performs
(air traffic control) outweighed Brown's interests as a citizen."272 In de-
ciding whether the employee's remarks addressed a matter of public
concern, the court, applying Connick, looked to the "content, form, and
context" of the statements." The court concluded that Brown's com-
ments "extended well beyond the local union hall and his friends, the
controllers, to rise to the level of speech on a matter of urgent public
concern."
274
More interesting is the court's analysis with regard to the second part
of the test. The court reasoned that "on the agency's side of the balance
was the seriousness of the general situation: a nationwide strike, illegal
and a criminal offense under federal law . ... "275 The court went on to
focus on Brown's "duty of loyalty," holding that his remarks were not
constitutionally protected.2 76 The court reasoned that "Brown's position
as a supervisor not only to whom nine controllers reported but who re-
ported himself to higher-level agency management, weigh[ed] heavily on
the agency's side."277 To bolster its reasoning, the court quoted
Brousseau v. United States,28 in a First Amendment context:
"Management cannot function effectively unless it operates 'with one voice' vis-a-
vis others. Cohesive operation of management is dependent on the loyalty of infe-
rior management to superior management. This loyalty must be maintained in
situations involving management's relations with nonmanagerial employees. For
management to countenance disloyalty in such situations would be for manage-
ment to render itself impotent."2"
271. See id. at 545-46.
272. See id. at 546 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1967)).
273. See id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
274. See id.
275. Id. at 547.
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. 640 F.2d 1235 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
279. Brown, 735 F.2d at 547 (quoting Brousseau, 640 F.2d at 1249). It is of note
that the court also found that the necessary nexus existed between Brown's conduct
and his job responsibilities in a supervisory position. See id. at 548. The court re-
marked that "Brown's 'common sense should have forewarned him' that appearing
before a union hall full of strikers, even though those strikers were his friends, could
easily turn into a situation where his loyalty to management could be case in
doubt-as indeed it was." See id. (quoting Brousseau, 640 F.2d at 1247). Still, the
court found the penalty of removal too severe and remanded the case for mitigation
of that penalty. See id. at 548-49.
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A case that outlines with clarity the law in this area is Roberts v. Van
Buren Public Schools.2" Two elementary teachers filed three grievances
against a school district on forms developed by the union.2"' The first
grievance expressed dissatisfaction with the handling of parental com-
plaints regarding seating arrangements for the bus on a class trip.'
The second grievance criticized the failure of the school to provide mon-
etary support for the trip.2" The third grievance noted a lack of teach-
ing supplies.2" The school district did not renew the teachers' con-
tracts." At trial, the teachers argued that by not renewing their con-
tracts the board acted in "retaliation for their protected speech activities,
[and] deprived them of their rights under the [First and [F]ourteenth
[A]mendments."2" The judge submitted to the jury the following in-
struction: "Do you find that the teacher was engaged in activity protected
by the First Amendment and that the protected activity was a substantial
or motivating factor in any of the defendants decisions not to renew her
teaching contract?"287
The jury answered "no" to this interrogatory.2' The Eighth Circuit
ruled that the use of the jury instruction to determine whether the
teachers' speech was protected was improper.2 9 According to the
court, "'[tihe inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law,
not fact"'29 ° and thus, subject to summary judgment. 291
Particularly interesting is the court's declarations of law with respect
to the First Amendment claims of the teachers. Invoking Pickering and
stating the teachers did not relinquish their First Amendment rights to
comment on matters of public interest, the court proceeded to apply a
three-step analysis:292
First, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their conduct was protected; second, plain-
tiffs must demonstrate that such protected conduct was a substantial or motivat-
280. 773 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985).
281. See id. at 952.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 953.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 954.
290. Id. at 954 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)).
291. See id.
292. See id. at 953-54.
ing factor in the adverse employment decision; and third, the employer may show
that the employment action would have been taken even in the absence of the
protected conduct.
Identification of protected activity since Connick is a two-step process in itself.
As a threshold matter, the speech must have addressed a "matter of public con-
cern,"
" 3
. . . then, the interest of the employee in so speaking must be balanced
against "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.""
The court pointed out the Picketing balance looks to the following fac-
tors:
(1) the need for harmony in the office or work place; (2) whether the
government's responsibilities require a close working relationship to exist be-
tween the plaintiff and co-workers when the speech in question has caused or
could cause the relationship to deteriorate; (3) the time, manner, and place of the
speech; (4) the context in which the dispute arose; (5) the degree of public in-
terest in the speech; and (6) whether the speech impeded the employee's ability
to perform his or her duties.295
In determining whether the teachers' speech addressed a matter of "pub-
lic concern," the court stated that:
We need not proceed to the Pickering balance when the employee spoke not as a
citizen but as an employee expressing a personal grievance as to internal office
policy. The state has a greater interest in regulating the speech of its employees
than it has in regulating the speech of its citizenry in general, and respect for
fundamental rights does not require that the first amendment be read to afford to
state employees a grant of immunity for job-related grievances not afforded to
those who do not work for the state.'
The court declared that "[tihe public nature of the subject of the
speech... is not negated by the fact that, as here, the employees chose
to communicate their concerns privately."297 However, the court also
pointed out that the teachers' grievances went more to the relationship
between employee and employer than to the discharge by the school
administration of its public educational function.298 The court also
found that the time and manner of the employees' speech "implicate to a
great degree legitimate concerns of the government, as an employer, with
insubordination versus respect for proper authority and decision-making
procedures . "..."299
293. Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 143, 146).
294. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968)).
295. Id. (citing Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 644 (8th
Cir. 1933)).
296. See id. at 955 (citations omitted).
297. Id.
298. See id. at 956.
299. See id. at 956-57.
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IV. ARBITRATION DECISIONS
Even in the private sector where constitutional restrictions are not
applicable absent state action," a review of arbitral case law, both
published and unpublished, indicates that arbitrators track the holdings
of the courts and apply a Pickering-type balancing test to employee
speech. Arbitrators may consider the public concern of the employee's
speech, but rarely do they discuss it as a threshold requirement. Instead,
and like the courts that skip a Connick analysis, the nature of the speech
is analyzed within the context of a Pickering balancing process. Without
question and with few exceptions, arbitrators take the position that de-
faming or unjustly criticizing the employer is an industrial offense and an
act of disloyalty." 1 While application of any balancing test may invite
what Professor Laurence Tribe calls "standardless balancing,"" 2 arbitra-
tors have formulated criteria to be applied in post hoc employee disci-
plinary cases.
300. See Huron Forge & Mach. Co. v. United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement
Workers of Am., Local 174, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 83, 90 (1980) (Roumnell, Arb.). In Hu-
ron Forge & Machine Co., the arbitrator correctly ruled that the First Amendment
does not prohibit private conduct unaccompanied by governmental action. See id. The
arbitrator sustained the dismissal of an employee despite a First Amendment claim
for distributing leaflets entitled "strike or go under" and advocating violence against
racists, Nazis, and members of the Ku Klux Klan. See id. at 96-97. Arbitrator
Roumell, quoting the decision of the Supreme Court in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507 (1976), stated:
It is, of course, a common place that the constitutional guarantee of free
speech is a guarantee only against abridgement by government, federal or
state. Thus, while statutory or common law may in some situations extend
the protection or provide redress against a private corporation or persons
who seek to abridge the free expression of others, no such protection or
redress is provided by the Constitution itself.
Huron Forge & Mach. Co., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 90 (quoting Hudgens, 424 U.S. at
513). From this language, it is apparent that the union's argument that the employee
has a First Amendment right to distribute literature on Company property must be
rejected. See id. at 90-91.
The decision of Arbitrator Roumell reflects the thinking of most arbitrators. See
generally MARVIN HILL JR. & ANTHONY SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 243-55
(1989) (discussing improperly seized evidence and the application of constitutional
constraints).
301. See Tim BORNSTEIN & ANN GOSLINE ET AL., LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
§ 20.05(1) (1989).
302. See TRIBE, supra note 182, at 931 n. 15.
Discussing the role of employee free speech in the workplace, Arbitra-
tor Carlton Snow stated:
Free speech rights are not lost in the work place, but there is also an obligation
not to be a disruptive influence. One arbitrator has defined the duty of an
[employee's] loyalty as "the obligation to do his best to act or refrain from acting
so as to enhance rather than to endanger the best interests of his employer. Loyal-
ty usually is manifested in the context of voluntary acceptance of a relationship
which itself implies an assumption of an identity of interests and support of a
common effort and continued effectiveness."303
Arbitrator Snow went on to outline the criteria that are considered in
balancing the rights of management vis-a-vis the employee:
There are a number of relevant factors to be considered in analyzing breaches
of an employe[e]'s duty of loyalty. For example, was the disputed conduct ex-
pressed orally or in writing? Written expressions generally have been viewed by
arbitrators as more serious. Second, were disputed statements of an employe[e]
reasonably believed to be "true" or "false" when made? If known to be "partially
true" or if proven to be "false," this has been a significant factor in arbitral deci-
sions. Another factor considered by arbitrators in disloyalty cases has been the
tone of statements made by an employe[e]. Was the tone malicious, inflammatory,
disruptive, or [did it place] the company in a position of ridicule? One arbitrator
has been clear about the fact that this theme in arbitral law has remained sensi-
tive to "free speech" rights of employe[e]s and does recognize that there may be
circumstances that require an employe[e] to "go public" with certain disputes.'
Arbitrator Snow went on to note the observations of a fellow arbitrator:
Before [going public], an employee should attempt to get all the facts and give his
or her employer an opportunity to explain or correct the problem. If no satisfac-
tion results, then and only then may an employee go public, and if so, such em-
ployee must be willing to assume the consequences if he or she is wrong.'
Reflecting the better view regarding employee speech, Arbitrator Snow
concluded:
As a general rule, injurious remarks against an employer that damage the
employer's image or adversely affect employe[e] discipline or morale are grounds
for discharge or substantial discipline. This is particularly true when such remarks
are made in public or to individuals outside one's facility.'
Arbitrator Adolph M. Koven, in United Cable Television Corp. v.
Freight Checkers Local 856,307 applied the criteria cited by Arbitrator
Snow and added an additional one:
Issues of loyalty and free speech ordinarily go hand in hand. This is particularly
the case where loyalty is in issue (with the possible exception of conflict-of-inter-
303., United Grocers, Inc. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 37, Local 962, 93 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1289, 1292 (1992) (Snow, Arb.) (quoting Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 67-
2 Labor Arb. Award (CCH) 8658 (1967)).
304. See id. at 1292-93 (citations omitted).
305. See id. at 1293.
306. See id.
307. 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 3 (1988) (Koven, Arb.).
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est situations such as those involving the holding of a second job with a compet-
ing employer). Five of the many factors discussed by [Arbitrator Joe] Gentile in
Zellerbachk Paper Co. [v. Freight Checkers, Clerical Employees and Helpers Un-
ion, Local 856] are especially apt in the Grievant's case: (1) whether the act or
conduct was expressed orally or in writing; (2) whether the act or conduct was
directed toward persons within the private organization or outside the organiza-
tion; (3) "(I)f 'harm' is found by an arbitrator, ... and there are certainly varying
degrees noted in the reported decisions, arbitrators take a firm stand and will
generally find support in the facts to sustain some degrees of discipline;" (4)
whether the "tone" or actual language of the statements were malicious, slander-
ous, inflammatory, disruptive; (5) whether there were "substantial rights of ex-
pression. . . " involved. This Arbitrator would add another factor: (6) whether the
act or conduct, if outside proper union channels, was directed to disrupt the legit-
imate goals of the collective bargaining process and the proper relationship be-
tween the parties.'
Announcing he was "formulat[ing] a set of standards for judging whis-
tle-blowing in the public sector,""9 Arbitrator Howard Sacks, writing
for a tripartite Board of Arbitration,1 ° formulated the following stan-
dards to be applied in balancing the interests of employer and employee:
1. The significance of the activity exposed by the act of whistle-blowing. The
more important such interest, the greater the protection that ought to be afforded
the whistleblower. Compare the communication of information about (1) illegal
acts; (2) the investment of municipal pension funds in corporations doing business
in South Africa; and (3) a projected reorganization of a six-person clerical unit in
a recreation department that would reduce the whistleblower's responsibilities.
2. The employee's motives in becoming a whistleblower. Are they purely per-
sonal, e.g., to protect or advance his own career, or to damage someone else's ca-
reer? Or are they directed toward vindicating the public's interest in preventing
fraud, waste or criminal activity?
3. Whether the information given by the employee is true, and if not, the
employee's "state of mind" regarding the truth of such information. Thus, if it
turns out that the employee is mistaken, did he have reasonable grounds for be-
lieving the truth of his charges? Or was he guilty of knowing use of false infor-
mation or of reckless indifference to the truth of such information? In this regard,
we prefer the standard established by the Civil Service Reform Act, "reasonable
belief," to the somewhat lower standard enunciated in Pickering, any state of
mind other than "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity of
the information."
4. The means chosen by the employee to communicate his information or alle-
308. See id. at 10 (citations omitted) (quoting Zellerbachk Paper Co. v. Freight
Checkers, Clerical Employees and Helpers Union, Local 856, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 868,
875-76 (1980) (Gentile, Arb.)).
309. Town of Plainville Conn. v. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employ-
ees Local 1303, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 161, 166 (1981) (Sacks, Arb.).
310. See id. at 161.
gations. Ordinarily, internal channels should first be used, unless there are good
reasons for not using them, such as a reasonable belief that his superiors will do a
poor or dishonest job of investigating the matter. If special channels for
whistleblowers are established,... the employee should use this channel. If the
circumstances justify going outside of regular channels, does the employee write
his legislator or the prosecutor, or does he arrange a media event? If he attempts
to maintain his anonymity, is there good reason for it, such as a legitimate fear of
employer reprisal?
5. The potential or actual harm to the employer caused by the whistleblowing.
Harm can take several forms: creation of disharmony within the enterprise; im-
pairment of discipline of the whistleblower and others; other interference with
efficiency; damage to the employer's relations with other government agencies,
persons it services, taxpayers, or citizens generally. The employer's ability to de-
fend itself must also be considered, such as its ability promptly and effectively to
refute false charges of wrongdoing.
Compare a charge by a high-level employee in a municipal water department
that another city department has been polluting the city reservoir with a charge
by a low-level employee in a state agency that his supervisor is using an office
typewriter to type personal letters.
6. The employee's right to engage in self-expression, that is, his freedom, as a
citizen, to exercise his rights of free speech and the right to petition".
31
Applying the above criteria and stating that the arbitration board was
"not declaring open season on government agencies," Arbitrator Sacks
reversed the dismissal of an employee (despite the Arbitrator's concern
about the "Grievant's future usefulness as a town employee") for notify-
ing a councilman anonymously that a town-owned machine, "claimed
missing or stolen," may have, instead, been misappropriated.312 The
employee also stated that he believed that the authorities conducted an
improper investigation of the matter.313 Arbitrator Sacks concluded with
a cautionary warning to other employees: "Anyone who wants to blow
the whistle ought carefully to consider the several limitations we-and
other tribunals-have placed on that activity.""4
Arbitrator Morris Shanker reported a 1997 decision315 involving the
discipline of a clerk-typist working in a water treatment plant who sent a
memo to the city council asserting management was engaging in illegal
activities involving the plant's operation. 6 Citing both Connick and
Pickering, Arbitrator Shanker upheld the employee's three day suspen-
sion reasoning that "considering the content, time, place and manner of
Grievant's public statements," the speech was not protected under the
311. See id. at 166-67.
312. See id. at 161, 171.
313. See id. at 161.
314. See id. at 171.
315. City of Wooster v. Wooster Employees Ass'n, 109 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 230 (1997)
(Shanker, Arb.).
316. See id.
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First Amendment. 17 The arbitrator pointed out that the employee made
her statements "with next to no objective evidence to support them."'318
Arbitrator Shanker also noted that the employee's "high school diploma
plus her service as a clerk-typist at the Water Plant hardly qualify her as
one capable of dealing with the highly technical and scientific determina-
tions that must be made in connection with operating and building a wa-
ter plant.""3 9 Furthermore, the arbitrator found it important that the
employee's statements "were much more than mere expressions of dis-
agreement with management."32 Rather, the statements "impugned the
honesty and integrity of the City Council."32" ' A mere belief of miscon-
duct, with no reasonable and good faith effort to determine the accuracy
of the information, was insufficient to provide a safe harbor for the em-
ployee.3' The arbitrator's final comments recognized the efficiency and
goal-oriented function of the organization:
Comparable to any other private production facility, managerial decisions to im-
prove the production facility, and which are made after proper investigation,
needs to be respected by the employees who are called upon to implement these
decisions. Further, employee morale is seriously undercut when one of the em-
ployees publicly impugns the integrity and honesty of the remaining employees.
This is not to suggest that mere disagreement with managerial decisions is
cause for employee disciplinary action, so long as it is presented through proper
channels in good faith and supported by sound arguments and/or objective evi-
dence. Indeed, such constructive criticism often can be helpful in improving the
production effort.
But, at some point, a managerial decision, made after consideration of all of
the available evidence and competing viewpoints, must be respected by the em-
ployees who need to carry it out. If doing so becomes too personally burdensome
for a particular employee, then her appropriate action is not to continue vocifer-
ously to oppose and criticize the decision. That can only lead to the undercutting
of legitimate managerial authority, as well as strife, disharmony, and demoraliza-
tion in the work place. Rather, an employee who finds it impossible to live with a
particular managerial decision must seriously consider transferring to another
situation where the managerial decision will not affect her.3 3
In the rare case where management can offer no good reason to regu-
late the employee's speech, disputes are likely to be resolved in favor of
the employee. Arbitrator Ronald Talarico, in Hicksville Exempted Village
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See id.
Board of Education v. HicksviUe Education Ass'n,' considered the
free speech argument of a teacher who received a letter of reprimand for
making a statement at a school board meeting that contradicted the su-
perintendent. 25 While seated in the audience, the teacher stated that no
teacher earns the $39,000 proffered by the superintendent (who had the
podium at the time) as the amount the district would save by not filling a
teacher vacancy.326 The administration subsequently verified that six
teachers made that amount or more. 7 Applying a Pickering balancing
test, Arbitrator Talarico ruled for the teacher. 28 Consistent with
Connick, the arbitrator reasoned that the key factor was "whether the
employee's speech touch[ed] a matter of 'public concern"' and, "[c]on-
versely, [whether] the speech deal[t] with personnel disputes or grievanc-
es with management. '" 32 9 The arbitrator found that although the teacher
had a "personal interest in ... what teachers earn[ed] this did not reduce
her comment to being one of purely personal interest." 'O Failing "to see
how [the] superintendent could take personal offense at or be embar-
rassed" at the comment, the Arbitrator found the comment "innocu-
ous.
"331
In O'Connor v. Ortega,' the Supreme Court explored the reason-
ableness of a government employee's expectation of privacy in his gov-
ernment-issued desk and files.' Ortega involved a search of the desk
and files of a state employee on administrative leave during an investiga-
tion of work-related misconduct.' During the course of the search, the
administration seized several items belonging to Ortega. 35 The majority
of the Court held that Ortega's expectation of privacy in his desk and
filing cabinets was reasonable. 6 Justice O'Connor, writing for four jus-
tices, pointed out that employees' expectation of privacy "may be re-
duced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legiti-
mate regulation." 7 Although the majority did not reach a consensus as
324. 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 214 (1994) (Talarico, Arb.).
325. See id. at 215.
326. See id.
327. See id. at 218.
328. See id. at 219.
329. See id. at 218.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
333. See id. at 711-12.
334. See id. at 712-13.
335. See id. at 713.
336. See id. at 719.
337. See id. at 717. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. See id. at
709. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Powell joined the opinion. See
id.
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to what standard to use for public employer searches, what is important
in Ortega is that the Court specifically rejected management's argument
that "[government] employees can never have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in [his or her] place of work."' Thus, an employee who is
given areas or equipment for his or her exclusive use can legitimately
assert a reasonable expectation, absent practice or regulation to the
contrary.'
Do employee's have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail
and the messages they send? In the only reported decision we know on
the subject, Arbitrator Ronald Talarico, in Conneaut School District,"
reversed the discipline (a letter of reprimand) of a librarian for using her
employer's e-mail system to send outside librarian's messages that com-
plained about the school's curriculum policy." The Administration is-
sued the reprimand because of the librarians use of the school's comput-
er to express her personal opinion.3" In reversing management, Arbitra-
tor Talarico applied a Pickering-type balancing test and declared: "We
must start from the premise that as a basic tenet of constitutional law
freedom of speech is not an absolute. Moreover, in situations where a
public employer places limitations upon the speech of its employees a
balancing of interests approach must be considered."" Furthermore,
the arbitrator found that other teachers had criticized the new curricu-
lum plan during workshops and group meetings,' and the school dis-
trict did not discipline these other teachers. Additionally, the arbitrator
determined that "the Grievant would have been able to speak over the
338. See id.
339. See, e.g., Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 828 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that a
"[school] guidance counselor, charged with maintaining sensitive student records, in
the absence of an accepted practice or regulation to the contrary, enjoys a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his school desk"); United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d
1217, 1218-21 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding search of postal worker's locker after em-
ployee was observed taking package from work station to women's locker room,
noting regulations made clear lockers were subject to search); United States v. Blok,
188 F.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (holding that an employee's exclusive use of
desk made search for evidence of petty larceny unreasonable, noting the search was
not for official property needed for governmental use).
340. 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 909 (1995) (Talarico, Arb.).
341. See id. at 914.
342. See id. at 911-12.
343. See id. at 913; see also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968)
(holding that public employees have free speech protection for matters of public con-
cern).
344. See Conneaut, 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 913.
telephone or write personal letters ... expressing her reservations or
criticisms ... with impunity."34' Without the school's express in-
struction that the e-mail system be used for school purposes only, the
arbitrator could not fird a blatant misuse of the employer's system."
What was of note was the arbitrator's declaration that "freedom of
speech does not ordinarily attach to one's use of personal property
owned by another."" 7 His analysis accordingly tracked Ortega."8 He
found the message "appropriate." 9
One issue frequently litigated before labor arbitrators, courts, and
agencies concerns the special status of employees who serve as union
representatives. Are they accorded special consideration because of their
status and allowed more leeway to disparage management? Or, alterna-
tively, are they held to a higher standard of conduct because of their
special knowledge and responsibility? Does speech that would otherwise
result in discipline become "protected" if uttered at a union meeting? Do
arbitrators track National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) case law?
Interpreting section 7350 and 10(c)3"' of the National Labor Relations
Act,"2 the NLRB has recognized a duty of loyalty owed by employees
to their company, even though the Act itself makes no reference to pub-
lic disparagement or disloyalty. In NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,3" the Supreme Court af-
firmed an NLRB decision sustaining the dismissal of unionized techni-
cians working for Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company, a North
345. Id. at 914.
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. O'Connor v. Ortega, 408 U.S. 709 (1987).
349. See Conneaut, 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 914.
350. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). Section 7 provides in
relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
Id. Section 8(a)(1) provides in relevant: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in ,section 7 .... " National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994).
351. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994). Section 10(c)
in relevant part provides: "No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of
any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the pay-
ment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for
cause ...." Id.
352. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
353. 346 U.S. 464 (1953) [hereinafter Jefferson Standard].
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Carolina television station." The technicians distributed handbills con-
taining disparaging remarks about the quality of the station's product and
its business policies."
The issue of the case centered on whether the employees were dis-
charged for actual cause.356 It was clear they were discharged for their
disparaging attack on the company." ' What was not clear, however,
was whether this demonstration of disloyalty was adequate cause for
terminating the employees.'
In ruling against the employees, the Court noted the factors used in
making its decision: (1) the employees' attack did not relate to labor
practices at the company; (2) the speech made "no reference to wages,
hours, or working conditions[;]" (3) the policies attacked "finance and
public relations for which management, not technicians, [were] responsi-
ble[;]" (4) "[t]he attack asked for no public sympathy or support[;]" and
(5) the attack was continuing, "initiated while off-duty, upon the very
interests [the employees] were paid to conserve and develop."359 More
important, the Court noted that when employees continue to work, they
owe a duty of loyalty not to disparage the produce or services of their
employer or to hamper the employer's sales, even if such activity is not
illegal.3'6 According to the Court:
There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to
354. See id. at 465.
355. See id. at 467-68. The leaflet read in part:
IS CHARLOTTE A SECOND-CLASS CITY?
You might think so from the kind of Television programs being present-
ed by the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. over WBTV . . . . Did you
know that all the programs presented over WBTV are on film and may be
from one day to five years old. There are no local programs presented by
WBTV. You cannot receive the local baseball games, football games or other
local events because WBTV does not have the proper equipment to make
these pickups .... Why doesn't the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Com-
pany purchase the needed equipment to bring you the same type of programs
enjoyed by other leading American cities? Could it be that they consider
Charlotte a second-class community and only entitled [sic] to the pictures
now being presented to them?
WBT TECHNICIANS
Id. at 468.
356. See id. at 471.
357. See id.
358. See id. at 472.
359. See id. at 476.
360. See id. at 473.
his employer. It is equally elemental that the Taft-Hartley Act seeks to strengthen,
rather than to weaken, that cooperation, continuity of service and cordial contrac-
tual relation between employer and employee that is born of loyalty to their com-
mon enterprise."
The Court noted that "Congress, while safeguarding, in § 7, the right of
employees to engage in 'concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,' did not weaken the under-
lying contractual bonds and loyalties of employer and employee." 2
What is interesting is the Court's declaration that the "fortuity of the
coexistence of a labor dispute" does not afford the employees a de-
fense.363 The technicians' attack "was a concerted separable attack pur-
porting to be made in the interest of the public rather than in that of the
employees."" The Court accordingly left an opening for employees
who engage in disparaging speech that is "related to" a current labor dis-
pute.3"
The NLRB has been liberal in determining when employee speech is
sufficiently "related to" working conditions so as to be protected under
the Act.366 The problem for employees, however, is that unlike
Connick's public concern requirement,367 broad-based appeals to the
public will not be protected under the Act, no matter how much the
speech is related to issues of public concern, if the speech does not
361. Id. at 472.
362. Id. at 473 (quoting National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994)).
363. See id. at 476.
364. See id. at 477.
365. See id.
366. See, e.g., Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 813-15 (2d Cir.
1980) (distinguishing Jefferson Standard and upholding an NLRB determination pro-
tecting a nurse who made a report "analogous to complaints concerning safety viola-
tions made to appropriate governmental bodies"); Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 538
F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1976) (enforcing NLRB decision that protected employee's
letter to editors and television interviews complaining about low pay and nursing
shortages in general and employer's hospital, in particular); Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B.
832, 833-34 (1987) (applying Jefferson Standard's "related to" test, finding employee
speech regarding delinquency of employer's payments to health and safety plan pro-
tected); Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 284 N.L.R.B. 442, 443 (1987) (stating that "[tihere
is no rule that only concerted activity undertaken for the purpose of having a griev-
ance adjusted or in anticipation of some other action is entitled to protection under
Section 7"); Pincus Bros., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1065 (1978) (refusing to defer to
arbitrator's award finding cause for employee who distributed handbill critical to
management); American Hosp. Ass'n, 230 N.L.R.B. 54, 57 (1977) (finding that leaflets
critical of employer were protected when not distributed to general public and kept
within confines of employer's business). See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do
Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (1992) (discussing
the subject-matter limits of section 7 of the NLRA regarding free speech).
367. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
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advance the economic self-interest of employees in the bargaining
unit.' Public concern alone will not make the speech protected under
the Act.3" Arbitrators, however, have tracked NLRB case law regarding
striking a balance between employees's section 7 rights and manage-
ment's interest in not having its managers, products, or reputation dispar-
aged.37 In general, labor arbitrators hold that management may restrict
368. See Estlund, supra note 366, at 922. . "This seeming anomaly-the privileging
of material self-interest over moral responsibility under section 7-is all the more
striking to those familiar with the law governing the speech rights of public employ-
ees." Id.
369. See id. at 924.
370. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force, Luke Air Force Base, 90 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1065, 1071 (1988) (Cohen, Arb.) (finding that arbitrator lacks authority to grant
relief against newspaper publication of union's alleged false and misleading state-
ments, reasoning that "[t]o prohibit the Union from using its own choice of language
in describing its feelings would require censorship and/or denial of First Amendment
rights"); Greyhound Food Management, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 619, 621-22 (1985)
(Ellmann, Arb.) (reversing verbal reprimand to union steward who posted notices
stating employer intended to introduce "fast food" as way to "destroy union wages
and conditions" and noting strike at second facility and mass picketing); United
States Dep't of Navy, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 889, 893 (1980)
(Aronin, Arb.) (finding union did not violate parties' agreement where "employer has
not presented proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made, which would
constitute exception of employees' right of free speech under First Amendment"); San
Antonio Air Logistics Ctr., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1020, 1024 (1979) (Lilly, Arb.) (noting
that employer has burden of proof in showing that matters complained of in newspa-
per "did in fact contribute to a deterioration in the relationship between the parties");
Wisconsin Tissue Mills, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 271, 274 (1979) (Flagler, Arb.) (not-
ing that absent agreed upon contractual restrictions, a union's freedom of speech is
interpreted broadly under the Constitution). But see News-Sun Div. of Copley Press,
Inc., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1324, 1330 (1988) (Goldstein, Arb.) (allowing management to
move union bulletin board to a remote area where the board contained disloyal,
critical, scatological, and obscene material, reasoning "[t]he simple fact is that in the
area of labor relations, rights of free expression and free speech have been consis-
tently balanced with employer interests in discipline, production and safety, as well
as its rights to use physical property freely"); U.S. Army Soldier Support Ctr., 91 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1201, 1204 (1988) (Wolff, Arb.) (denying union free-speech defense for
posting article referring to a management official in a disparaging, disdainful, belittling
manner, where parties' collective bargaining agreement prohibited posting of material
containing "derogatory remarks" or "personal attacks on individuals"); Marion Com-
munity Sch., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 916, 920 (1987) (Ipavec, Arb.) (upholding school
board's written warning to teacher for directing derogatory comments at two non-un-
ion teachers for not supporting the union, stating "[p]rotected speech does not in-
clude coercion or humiliation of fellow employees . . . ."); San Antonio Air Logistic
Ctr., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1074, 1082 (1979) (Caraway, Arb.) (finding that union im-
properly published statement in newsletter advising members to oppose a survey that
what would otherwise be the "free speech" rights of employees, even
union stewards, "if there is a legitimate and overriding reason to do
so."371 It apparently matters little whether the employee is a union offi-
cial, although it does matter whether traditional union-type interests are
at issue.3"
In United Cable Television Corp., Arbitrator Adoph M. Koven rec-
ognized that speech critical of an employer may be protected concerted
activity under the National Labor Relations Act." Nevertheless, Arbitra-
tor Koven ruled that a shop steward's posting of a letter on a union bul-
letin board calling his employer's vice president a "liar" was outside the
zone of protected activity.375 Applying NLRB case law, the arbitrator
correctly reasoned that conduct, although concerted, can be unprotected
"if it maliciously disparages an employer or otherwise unduly interferes
with the employer's business interests."37 6 What is of note is the
arbitrator's finding that NLRB case law appeared to favor the grievant's
case.7 7 Arbitrator Koven cited Dreis & Krumpt Manufacturing Co.,"
where the NLRB stated that "'[offensive, vulgar, defamatory or opprobri-
ous remarks uttered during the course of protected activities will not
remove activities from the Act's protection unless they are so flagrant,
violent, or extreme as to render the individual unfit for further ser-
vice."'379 Arbitrator Koven found it irrelevant, at least with respect to
the protection issue, "whether accusations made in the course of union
activity were libelous or defamatory so as to support a lawsuit. " ' °
Following the views of some courts, an important consideration voiced
by many arbitrators :is whether the employee acted with malice." In
employer initiated to gather information concerning employees' attitude toward their
jobs).
371. See Rohr Indus., Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 273, 278 (1980) (Weiss, Arb.) ("What
these arbitration awards teach is that an employer may validly restrict the 'free
speech' activities of employees, even when they are engaged in Union business, if
there is a legitimate and overriding reason to do so.").
372. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 388, 392 (1994) (Odom
Jr., Arb.) (stating that "[pirotection for his rights as an advocate does not extend to
exempt him from the consequences of violations of work rules").
373. 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 3 (1988) (Koven, Arb.).
374. See id. at 8-12.
375. See id.
376. See id. at 9.
377. See id. at 12.
378. 221 N.L.R.B. 309 (1975).
379. United Cable Television Corp., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 9 (quoting Dreis A.
Krumpt Mfg. Co., 221 N.L.R.B. at 315 (citations omitted)).
380. See id.
381. See, e.g., NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding
employee's bad faith threat to complain to customer unprotected); American Arbitra-
tion Ass'n, 233 N.L.R.B. 71, 74-75 (1977) (finding employee's letters ridiculing
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Air Canada,' Arbitrator Howard Brown considered the suspension of
a union chairman for writing a letter to the district office castigating
management's handling of the grievance of an employee.' Management
argued the letter was libelous and insubordinate in nature.' In ruling
for the union, Arbitrator Brown quoted with approval the principles out-
lined by another arbitration board dealing with the speech issue:
"While generally a company may be entitled to expect a degree of faithfulness and
respect from employees in statements which they make after working hours it is
clear that an employer cannot hold employees to a standard of unquestioning
loyalty, especially where union business is concerned. It would be unrealistic not
to expect that a union steward will, whether in a speech or a newsletter, occa-
sionally express strong disagreement with the company and its officers and do so
in vivid and unflattering terms. Being at the forward edge of encounters with
management the shop steward becomes particularly vulnerable in the area of
discipline... [.]
If union stewards are to have the freedom to discharge their responsibilities in
an adversarial collective bargaining system they must not be muzzled into quiet
complacency by the threat of discipline at the hands of their employer .... The
statements of union stewards must be protected but that protection does not
extend to statements that are malicious in that they are knowingly or recklessly
false. The privilege that must be accorded to the statements of union stewards
made in the course of their duties is not an absolute licence [sic] or an immunity
from discipline in all cases.. [..]
In John's Super Valu,3s Arbitrator Ed Krinsky reversed the dismissal
of an employee who announced that if the owner "hadn't taken money
out of the registers, he wouldn't have to be blaming his help for it." 'n
Arbitrator Krinsky pointed out that the remark followed a union meeting
discussing the ability of the owners to pay the wages sought by the un-
ion.'s Similarly, in City of Williamsport,' Arbitrator Loewenberg re-
versed the suspension of a police officer who wrote an open letter criti-
employer's relationships with its customers unprotected); Coca Cola Bottling Works,
Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1054-55 (1970) (holding leaflet designed to create fear in the
public in drinking Coke was unprotected).
382. 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 172 (1981) (Brown, Arb.).
383. See id. at 172.
384. See id. at 179.
385. See id. at 180 (quoting Burns Meats Ltd. & Canadian Food & Allied Workers'
Local P-139 (June 1980) (Picher, Arb.) (unreported)).
386. 661 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1125 (1973) (Krinsky, Arb.).
387. See id. at 1125-26.
388. See id. at 1128.
389. 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 279 (1973) (Loewenberg, Arb.).
cal of management.39 The arbitrator found that the employee was car-
rying out a legitimate union function.9 '
Arbitrator Frank Murphy, in Mid-West Chandelier Co.,92 cited NLRB
v. Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, and specifically held that a union steward, who told two bar-
gaining-unit members that two management officials had bribed or bul-
lied an Asian supervisor, could be disciplined, even though the comments
were part of on-going collective bargaining and were made "intra un-
ion."393 After finding the activities protected, the arbitrator nevertheless
outlined the criteria to be applied in deciding whether the employee's
speech could result in discipline. 4 According to Arbitrator Murphy:
In determining whether or not the grievant's statements were such as to deprive
him of his protected status, consideration must be given to what he actually said,
to the circumstances in which his statements were made, to the effects of his
statements, as well as to any guidelines or standards utilized by the National La-
bor Relations Board and the courts in making such a determination.39
Arbitrator Murphy reasoned
that the statements and actions of the grievant were so unwarranted and had such
a negative effect on the integrity and reputation of the Company president and
such a potentially disruptive effect on plant operations and discipline, as well as
on relations among employees and between management and its employees, as to
place them outside the special status and protection accorded to him as Union
steward under the Agreement.3
6
Statements considered "flagrant," "obscene," "violent," "indefensible,"
or otherwise "extremely disparaging" will not be protected under the Act
and, as such, are unlikely to be sanctioned by arbitrators ruling on disci-
pline for this type of speech.l 7 Of course, what one arbitrator consid-
ers "flagrant," "obscene," "violent," "indefensible," or otherwise "extreme-
390. See id. at 285.
391. See id. (stating that, although discharged employee violated company policy by
not obtaining approval for letter from superiors, he did "not need such approval since
he was acting as [a] spokesman for the [union] and carrying out [a] legitimate [un-
ion] function").
392. 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 833 (1994) (Murphy, Arb.).
393. See id. at 837-38.
394. See id. at 838-39.
395. Id. at 839.
396. Id. at 840.
397. See, e.g., Tenesco Corp., 107 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 689, 692 (1996) (Nicholas, Arb.)
(stating that the "company recognizes the right of Union's stewards to present their
arguments zealously in grievance meetings, nevertheless, it is not the intention of the
Labor Relations Act to allow Union officers to make defamatory or slanderous accu-
sations"); Mid-West Chandelier Co., 102 Lab. Arb. 833, 841-42 (BNA) (1994) (Murphy,
Arb.) (affirming idea that if employee's conduct becomes so flagrant that it threatens
employer's ability to maintain order and respect it will not be protected).
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ly disparaging"" will receive a pass from another arbitrator. The final
outcome will, in significant part, be determined by the arbitrator's finding
regarding the employee's motivation, whether his conduct interfered with
the operation of the employer's business, and whether the parties' collec-
tive bargaining agreement in any way limits the form, manner, or timing
of the statements. Speech will generally be protected if it relates to the
employee's job (but not the job as it individually affects the employee),
the employee's status or conditions at work, union security, or
employees' overall common interests.'
V. CONCLUSION
The implications of Pickering and Connick for public management are
clear: the First Amendment, while protecting the speech of public em-
ployees, does not give an employee carte blanche license to castigate his
employer or his employer's product in a public forum. As so well put by
the Seventh Circuit, "public employeis do not lose theirability to control
behavior and speech in the workplace merely because they are govern-
mental bodies subject to the restraints of the First Amendment." °"
Courts have even recognized the employer's interest in protecting its
product and reputation against a First Amendment claim of freedom of
religion.4"' No hard and fast rules exist other than to stress that the key
398. See supra note 397.
399. See Huron Forge & Mach. Co., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 83, 91 (1980) (Roumell,
Arb.).
400. Yoggerst v. Hedges, 739 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1984).
401. See Lumpldn v. Brown, 109 F.3d 1498 (9th Cir. 1997). In Lumpkin, the City of
San Francisco removed the Reverend Eugene Lumpkin from his position as a member
of the San Francisco Human Rights Commission because of statements he made. See
id. at 1499. The statements cited by the City in removing Lumpkin included the fol-
lowing: "'[Tihe homosexual lifestyle is an abomination against God. So I have to
preach that homosexuality is a sin. See id. Lumpkin also stated, "'I believe everything
the Bible sayeth,' which includes belief in the proscription in Leviticus that a man
who sleeps with a man should be put to death." Id.
Lumplin sued the Mayor and the City, "claiming his removal violated his rights
under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993." See
id. at 1500; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1
(1994)). The district court granted the administration's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that the City was justified "because Reverend Lumpkin's public state-
ments were inconsistent with his 'broad responsibilities for formulating, implementing
and explaining [the] policy' of the Human Rights Commission, . . .and because his
dismissal did not constitute governmental establishment of religion." See id. at 1500
is whether the employee's speech touches a matter of public concern
and, according to the Connick Court, this is determined by the "content,
form, and context of a given statement."4"2 If the speech does not ad-
dress a "public concern," it is not entitled to constitutional protection.
No further inquiry is necessary.
What makes speech a matter of public concern? Simply because the
comments of the employee are in some way a matter of social interest
does not mean that the speech is protected by the First Amendment. To
be protected, the complaints must involve the public in some important
way. It apparently matters not whether the speech is made in private
conversation with a co-worker (although we believe Rankin v.
McPherson was decided incorrectly).4 "3 However, under the First
Amendment, the "main thrust" of the employee's speech must not take
the form of a private grievance. Case law indicates that when the
employee's speech deals only with personnel disputes or individual griev-
ances with management, it will not be protected.4 The rationale is that
such information, however accurate, adds little to the public's evaluation
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 1502.
The court stated "[tihe First Amendment strictly protect[ed] freedom of expres-
sion. Nonetheless, when the government acts as an employer, it has certain latitude
to protect its operations and policies from being subverted by its own personnel." Id.
at 1500 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675-77 (1994) (plurality opinion)). In
the court's view, "his First Amendment rights may be trumped by important interests
of the City he agreed to serve." Id. Applying Pickering, the court declared:
When we apply Pickering and weigh the City's interest in eliminating preju-
dice and discrimination against Reverend Lumpkin's First Amendment interest
in condemning homosexuality as a sin while serving as a voting member of
the Human Rights Commission, the conclusion is inescapable that the City's
interests prevail. As a private citizen, Reverend Lumpkin is perfectly free to
preach vigorously and robustly that homosexuality is a sin. But he did not
enjoy that same unrestrained freedom while he occupied the important and
prestigious office of a Human Rights Commissioner.
Id. at 1501. The court found that "the City's interest in having commissioners who
work to promote City policies far outweighs any commissioner's First Amendment
interest in publicly expressing views that subvert those policies." Id.
402. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 14748 (1983). One practitioner, addressing
the Connick test, quipped that making this judgment is "an interpretative task that is
tantamount to deciding what is good abstract art and what is bad abstract art." 35
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont) No. 1733, at 1294 (Oct. 6, 1997)
(quoting Dennis P. Duffy, former general counsel of the Congressional Office of Com-
pliance). "The outcome of such cases may depend on how well the attorneys are
able to shape the facts in deposition and explain what made a particular individual
angry or what motivated the plaintiff to speak out." Id.
403. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); see also supra notes 126-42 and
accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 228-56 and accompanying text; see also infra note 405 and
accompanying text.
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of the performance of government and, accordingly, is not a matter of
public concern.4"5 Courts, more so than arbitrators, generally require a
405. See McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1983). "Speech
by public employees may be characterized as not of 'public concern' when it is clear
that such speech deals with individual personnel disputes and grievances and that the
information would be of no relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance
of governmental agencies." Id. at 1114 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 140). The court
further stated that "[o]n the other hand, speech that concerns 'issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society' to make
informed decisions about the operation of their government merits the highest degree
of first amendment protection." Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1946)); see also Marohnic v. Walker, 800 F.2d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding dis-
closure of alleged fraudulent billing of a mental health board protected under First
Amendment); Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443, 452 (3rd Cir. 1985) (protecting
speech by chemistry professor regarding academic policy); Anderson v. Central Point
Sch. Dist. No. 6, 746 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that teacher coach's letter
to school board concerning structure of athletic program was protected because
"Connick does not require every word of a communication to be of interest to the
public"); O'Brien v. Town of Caledonia, 748 F.2d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that an officer is entitled to an injunction against an institution of disciplinary pro-
ceedings for disclosing potential police graft because "the public's interest in being
informed of serious governmental misconduct is very great"); Zook v. Brown, 748
F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding endorsement for particular ambulance service
by deputy sheriff protected); Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 723 F.2d
640, 644-45 (8th Cir. 1983) (protecting speech by assistant coach regarding excessive
use of corporal punishment by head coach). But see Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 652-
53 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding employee's complaint about non-enforcement of municipal
anti-smoking ordinance in his office, which focuses upon employee's own sensitivity
to smoke, and not made on behalf of others, communicated in private conversations
with his superiors, does not constitute speech on a matter of public concern); Pruitt
v. Howard County Sheriffs Dep't, 623 A.2d 696, 700-02 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)
(holding use of Nazi mannerisms, such as exaggerated German accents, Nazi salutes,
heel clicks, and using terms "achtung" and "seig hell" unprotected under First Amend-
ment).
There is good reason to challenge the "individual grievance" versus "matter of
public concern" classification. There are' numerous instances where conduct may give
rise to an individual grievance while at the same time be of interest to the public.
For example, a teacher is terminated for allowing students on a Spain trip to use
alcohol with the permission of their parents. Prior to the termination, she challenges
the "no alcohol policy" in the parties' negotiated grievance procedure and also goes
public with her complaint. Protected? A school district unilaterally eliminates smoking
in the faculty lounge. A teacher challenges her termination for sneaking a smoke. She
goes public. Protected? A railroad worker is disciplined for talking about the poor
way the railroad is run. Safety is just one issue he cites in his personal grievance to
management. Protected? The analysis is not advanced very far by simply concluding
that an activity is a personal grievance and thus, not deserving of protection. The
better inquiry, we believe, is to analyze what conduct, in what context, will give rise
clear issue of public concern before any Pickering-type balancing takes
place.
Moreover, even when the speech does touch a matter of public con-
cern, if the speech or activity (1) adversely affects the efficiency, disci-
pline, or administration of the public employer,4"' (2) impairs harmony
among co-workers (generally important in the protective services),"7
(3) has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which
personal loyalty is important,4"5 or (4) applying Connick has the poten-
tial to cause any of the above, the employee's conduct may still be sub-
ject to regulation.0 9 If management is citing organizational harmony or
discipline as an interest that is deserving of being balanced against the
employee's free speech claim, there must be some showing that harmony
or discipline is important to the organization. We submit that organiza-
tional discipline may be more important to military and para-military or-
ganizations (police, fire, the protective services) than, say, the summer
ground crew staff at a university and, in this respect, we see no infirmity
when a court or labor arbitrator takes judicial-type notice of this fact.
Loyalty requirements are not the same for all organizations.
Disloyal speech that is knowingly or recklessly false should not be
protected even if shown to have no harmful effect, although the Supreme
Court has not addressed this issue.410 Motive is apparently relevant. Ar-
bitrators who either apply or look to the law in deciding loyalty cases
take a balancing approach.41" ' Clear and simple, arbitrators have uni-
to a court or labor arbitrator concluding the speech is deserving of protection inde-
pendent of any reference to a private grievance.
406. See Jurgenson v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 880 (4th Cir. 1984).
407. See id.
408. See id.
409. See id. at 879.
Where personal or employee grievances are more the subject-matter of the
speech than matters of public interest it is the rule that "a wide degree of
deference to the employer's judgment is appropriate." . . . In fact, it has been
said that "under Connick, employment issues are not of a public con-
cern ...." Similarly, the judgment of the employer is generally to be de-
ferred to where, even if there is public concern, there is such concern "in
only a most limited sense."
Id. at 879-80 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1982) (citations omitted));
see also, Waldau v. Coughlin, No. 97-5162, 1997 WL 634539, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25,
1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 69663 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1998) (upholding removal for postal
employee's personal campaign to promote privatization of U.S. Postal Service).
410. The NLRB has ruled that the falsity of a communication does not necessarily
deprive it of its protected character. See Cordura Publications, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 230,
232 (1986).
411. See, e.g., County of Monterey, 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 841, 842-43 (1989) (Riker,
Arb.) (upholding 20 day suspension of employee for writing letters to state officials
protesting a promotion interview process because employee did not use official chan-
[Vol. 25: 721, 1998] Riding with the Cops & Cheering for the Robbers
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
formly recognized that the employment relationship is a two-way street
and an employee has certain responsibilities to his or her employer, in-
cluding loyalty. At a minimum, this means that an employee does not
have the right to disparage his employer's product or service without risk
of discipline.4" 2 As so well put by one arbitrator, "[ilndeed, in this sense
as compared to the world outside, the industrial world is a relatively
closed-society."4"3 In short, employees will not be able to bite the hand
that feeds them and stay for the banquet.414 Absent a statute to the con-
trary, this includes suing your employer4" 5 or writing articles or books
taking management to task.4 6
nels for complaints and he exceeded interests of public concern); City of Detroit, 83-
2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 5491, 5494 (1983) (McCormick, Arb.) (sustaining suspen-
sion of city auditor who, during an interview on a network television station, impli-
cated city officials in a coverup of improprieties in a contract with an oil company);
Town of Plainville, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 161, 165 (1981) (Sacks, Arb.) (finding
Pickering and "the host of decisions which have followed it" relevant); Douglas Coun-
ty, 79-2 Lab. Arb. Award (CCH) 5306, 5310 (1979) (Doyle, Arb.) (upholding suspension
of employee for maling public statements that care provided by hospital-employer
was inadequate); see also Los Angeles Harbor Dep't, 84 Lab. Arb. 860, 862 (1985)
(Weiss, Arb.) (holding city employer properly suspended employee for writing letter
to newspaper referring to department head as "head inquisitor"); United States Dep't
of the Navy, 75 Lab. Arb. 889, 895-96 (1980) (Aronin, Arb.) (holding employee's use
of media to resolve grievance disputes was permitted, reasoning, in part, that the
activity was protected under the First Amendment).
412. See, e.g., Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 880, 883 (1984)
(Schedler, Arb.) (sustaining 20 day suspension for employee who, as a "joke," wrote
on bottom of posted newspaper that his employer "builds junk").
413. United Cable Television, Corp., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 3, 11 (1988) (Koven, Arb.).
414. See Forest City Publ'g Co., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 773, 783 (1972) (McCoy, Arb.)
("Can you bite the hand that feeds you, and insist on staying for future banquets?").
415. See Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 743, 749 (1985) (Taylor,
Arb.) (sustaining dismissal of employee for filing lawsuit against employer and claim-
ing damages of $1,500,000 for injuries because the "Company is entitled to some
measure of loyalty from its Employees and should not be required to continue the
employment of an individual who has taken spiteful and vengeful action against Man-
agement in a public denouncement").
416. See United Press Int'l, Inc., 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 841, 842-45 (1990) (Ables, Arb.)
(sustaining discharge of newspaper journalist who wrote and published book about
his employer's financial difficulties, bankruptcy, management, and ownership based on
his experience as investigative reporter). In United Press, the arbitrator stated:
[Ilt is in the fabric of American institutions, including the workplace, that if
an employee, bargaining unit or not, effectively declares war against his em-
ployer about how the employer is conducting his business, he must do it
from outside his job. Writing a book about an employer is no different than
other jobs. A certain loyalty to the employer must be presumed. Public criti-
What, then, is left of speech within the context of employment? With
few exceptions, courts and arbitrators have made it clear that an employ-
ee cannot "ride with the cops and cheer for the robbers."417 The duty of
loyalty has survived the First Amendment, both in the public sector and
(absent state action and access to arbitration) even more so in the pri-
vate sector where the common law employment at-will doctrine is alive
and well. The clear message for employees is "keep your mouth shut"
and do not criticize anyone in the organizational chain of command ex-
cept in those rare situations where the speech brings to light actual or
potential wrongdoing on the part of governmental officials 4 'or, in the
private sector, a clear violation of a statute by management. Simply ad-
dressing the internal workings or evaluation of management, without
more, will not find sympathy from many courts or most labor arbitrators
even if the message is of concern to the public. "[T]he government as
employer indeed has far broader powers (to regulate speech] than does
the government as sovereign."" 9 Absent the rare case where manage-
ment offers no convincing reason to forbid the speech (in this situation
there is a presumption in favor of the employee),42 ° the balancing is
likely to be resolved in favor of management in loyalty cases. Rarely will
courts require management to provide actual evidence of the harm it
alleges, a fact that should not go unnoticed by management attorneys.
Making it even harder for an employee to assert a successful First
Amendment claim, under Mt. Healthy, a legitimate, nonspeech reason for
an employee's dismissal is a complete defense to a firing for protected
speech if the reason motivated management. 1 The lesson for public
cism, which may destroy the subject, is not in keeping with honorable rela-
tions between employers and employees.
Id.
417. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I
agree with the proposition, felicitously put by Constable Rankin's counsel, that no
law enforcement agency is required by the First Amendment to permit one of its
employees to 'ride with the cops and cheer for the robbers."').
418. But see Azzaro v. Allegheny County, No. 95-3253, 1996 WL 426792, at *14 (July
31, 1996), vacated, 91 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that "speech is a matter of
public concern if it discloses malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of a public offi-
cial of sufficient gravity to be of legitimate interest to members of the community").
419. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (citations omitted).
420. See, e.g., Brown v. Disciplinary Comm. of Edgerton Volunteer Fire Dep't, 97
F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing district court's dismissal of lawsuit challeng-
ing the suspension of firefighter for writing a letter to a newspaper opposing a
change in the fire district's name, reasoning "it is hard to see how a debate on the
proper name for the District (or Department) would be disruptive at all").
421. See Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd: of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1977);
see also Sagendorf-Teal v. County of Rensselaer, 100 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that a "mixed motives" defense requires a properly motivated same-day ac-
tion).
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management is to dismiss employees not for their speech but for some
made-up performance-based reason. The employee is then left with the
difficult task of showing the reason for dismissal was pretextual. Further-
more, under Churchill, if management conducts an investigation and be-
lieves the results, the deference-to-management equation is further bal-
anced against the employee, regardless of whether a reviewing court
would reach a different result. One context where employee speech
rights may be substantively recognized as protected under the NLRA
(which, of course, is not applicable to public employers) is where the
speech is part of current collective bargaining efforts or a labor dispute,
and relates to wages, hours, or working conditions, and the speech is
"uttered in the context of a conventional appeal for support of the union
in the labor dispute."422 Still, the speech connected to a labor controver-
sy must not contain statements to the point of. being egregious.4" No
litmus test exists in determining when speech within a collective bar-
gaining/labor union context is outside the envelope of fair play. A fair
reading of Board and arbitral opinions tracking NLRB case law is that if
the speech satisfies the above criteria, employees will have more literary
license to disparage and denigrate their employers than would otherwise
be allowed. It may also be of help to the employee if he or she can point
to a professional code of ethics making employees "duty bound" to act to
improve standards in the profession.424 Further, it helps if the employee
makes his speech off-duty away from the job site in a non-public forum
(thus limiting the damage to management). Finally, it may help the em-
ployee if he or she makes the criticism through internal channels in a re-
spectful and polite manner.
In Churchill, Justice O'Connor queried: "What is it about the
government's role as employer that gives it a freer hand in regulating the
speech of its employees than it has in regulating the speech of the public
at large?"42 Pickering, Connick, Churchill, and Mt. Healthy are engen-
dered by the private-sector profit maximization model. It is "Adam
Smith" pure and unadulterated. If government is to operate efficiently
422. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 477 (1953); see also supra notes 353-65 and accompanying
text (discussing Jefferson Standard).
423. See, e.g., Columbus Educ. Ass'n v. Columbus City Sch. Dist., 623 k.2d 1155,
1160 (1980) (stating that "egregious misconduct" would take "speech outside the lim-
its of protected activity").
424. See, e.g., Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 814 n.9 (2d Cir.
1980) (discussing the use of a professional code in an employee speech dispute).
425. Churchill v. Waters, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994).
within the market, it must have the power to demand cooperation from
its employees, even if the market in which it operates is monopolistic.
Employers are entitled to employ individuals who share its organizational
philosophy.426 It is nothing more than matching skills to the job. At min-
imum, as part of a duty of loyalty, management may demand that its em-
ployees engage in no speech that disparages its service, product, or man-
agers. The standard may not be "duty, honor, country," but it is close.
Virtue is its own reward for employees when it involves their employer's
business.
Does all this make for good law? Is society worse off because of the
termination risk to employees who elect to "stir things up?" As early as
1919, Justice Holmes declared that "[t]he most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic," '427 thus recognizing that freedom of speech was
not absolute."8 Justice Holmes also noted that "the First Amendment
while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have
been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every pos-
sible use of language."429 The exercise of free speech is subject to re-
striction "if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to
protect the State from destruction or from serious injury, political, eco-
nomic, or moral."4" In 1951, in Dennis v. United States," Justice
Frankfurter endorsed a "balancing test" reasoning that "[t]he demands of
free speech in a democratic society are better served by candid and in-
formed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the
judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-
Euclidian problems to be solved."432 The alternative to balancing, of
course, is the "rights-privilege" approach.4" We see no utility in courts
analyzing public employment in terms of a privilege where public em-
ployees have no First Amendment rights.
The balancing test announced by Justice Frankfurter in Dennis has
been the guiding star in employee speech cases. Although many of the
426. See, e.g., Wales v. Board of Educ. of Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. 300, 120 F.3d 82,
84-85 (7th Cir. 1997) ("A school district is entitled to put in its classroom teachers
who share its educational philosophy.").
427. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
428. See id. (formulating the "clear and present danger" test).
429. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (citing Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)); see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 461
(1907) (noting the existence of exceptions to the Bill of Rights' protections).
430. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
431. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
432. See id. at 524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
433. See, e.g., Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1230-
34 (6th Cir. 1997) (Ryan, J., concurring), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 164 (1997) (discuss-
ing rights and privileges of plaintiff in a speech dispute).
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results reported by the courts are suspect, the overall process, as we see
it, is fair if applied. What we see, however, is a disparately-weighted
interest of government in self-preservation and economic efficiency. We
also see substantial weight accorded to the employer's prediction of dis-
ruption unaccompanied by hard evidence. The employment context is
one case where "saying it may make it so," at least in the judicial forum.
Is this "outside the pale of fair judgment?"4" Can a systematic bias to-
ward employers be justified? If an employer can fire anyone it wants
with no checks, a primary source of information from those most likely
"in the know" (the so-called "insiders") will be lost.435 This is the down
side when the balancing process is given short shrift. With the exception
of Rankin, for the most part the courts' balancing has been in line with
traditional microeconomic theory of profit maximization and economic
efficiency. Ironically, an employee, asserting a free speech right within an
employment context, may fare better in the arbitral forum than before
the courts, especially where the employee is engaging in behavior argu-
ably protected under labor law. Arbitrators routinely cite Connick and
Pickering, even though not applicable to private-sector employers, in
arriving at an accord between the rights of an employer to efficiently
operate in a market-oriented economy and the rights of an employee to
address matters of public concern. Unlike the courts, however, we be-
lieve arbitrators, applying a "just cause" standard under a collective bar-
gaining agreement (where the burden of proof is on management), re-
quire hard evidence of harm to the employer when applying a case-by-
case Pickering balancing test.
Must an employee join in management's philosophy regarding what is
best for the organization? Employees, of course, are free to think and
believe as they wish. Even though fixed standards are incapable of for-
mulation (outside of the few paradigm cases law professors love to think
of), employees are, however, duty bound to stay the course by not engag-
ing in speech disparaging or vilifying the organization, its products, man-
agers, or reputation. They need not be like King Arthur's knights but they
must be loyal subjects (without the loyalty oath). Contrary to the func-
tion of speech under our democratic system of government-where ac-
cording to Justice Douglas, it is designed to invite dispute, create unrest,
dissatisfaction, or "even stir people to anger" 6-employers should not
434. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 540.
435. See Daniel A Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the
First Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REV. 554, 581 (1991).
436. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949). Justice Douglas, writing for
be forced to contend with employee speech that undercuts the organiza-
tion. Like Victor Hugo's Napoleonic France of 1832, the law of employee
speech is economics with "the guillotine of dismissal" waiting for those
employees who fail to conform.4 37 The law reflects the view that man-
agement should not have to compete for the loyalty of its workforce
even though the public may have an interest in what the employee has to
say.
the majority, stated:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dis-
pute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though
not absolute, . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious sub-
stantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
Id. (citations omitted).
437. Cf. VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES (Penguin Books) (1987) (1862). "The guillo-
tine is the law made concrete; it is called the Avenger. It is not neutral and does not
permit you to remain neutral." Id. at 16.
